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ABSTRACT 
Interagency relationships such as joint measures to control and prevent HIV/AIDS address problems of human 
service fragmentations and duplications. However, for the joint working relationships to be effective, the partner 
agencies need to equally share power/autonomy as well as other resources and the government needs to supply 
conducive environments to enable the same. This study addresses the practise of inter-organisational working 
relationships with focus on nature of resource sharing and government support to interagency working 
relationships. Agencies (n=3) involved in the control and prevention of HIV/AIDS in New Zealand were 
interviewed to analyse the nature of resource sharing among the partner agencies, and the extent of government 
influence on these. Results show that the government supplies conducive environments for interagency working 
relationships. Three key factors determine resource contributions by the agencies involved in the control and 
prevention of HIV/AIDS i.e. the depth of the relationship, .the similarity of agency's core missions to HIV/AIDS, 
and the resource interdependencies of the agencies. The research findings imply that agencies will work together 
effectively only if the joint ventures have no s:ignificant consequences on partner agency's resources - in 
particular, autonomy, budget, domain problems, and professional carriers. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 General introduction 
This research study seeks to understand the applicability of the theory of interagency collaborations at an 
operational stage with major focus on resource contributions among the partner agencies and the extent of 
support from the national government to interagency works using a case study of HIV/AIDS control and 
prevention measures in New Zealand. 
Sowa, (2008), & Whitcombe, (2008), urge that interagency collaboration to deliver social services is 
becoming popular in many countries including the USA and New Zealand. The major objectives of the 
collaborative ventures are to address the common problems of fragmentations and duplications of human social 
services caused by many separated programs of various departments each addressing the same problems, 
albeit in a unique way, and to promote better coordination of social service delivery in the public sector. 
For instance, delivery of health services such as to control and prevent the pandemic disease HIV/AIDS, 
joint ventures of public, private, non-government and community organisations are highly recommended due to 
the multiple cross sectoral problems associated with the disease. The joint actions of the various institutions are 
highly appreciated and advocated for, by the WHO/UNAIDS. For example, WHO (2000) emphasizes the use of 
jointed and coordinated efforts of various institutions within and across nations to reduce the problems 
associated with HIV/AIDS, including poverty, non-adherence to treatments, increasing drug resistance, HIV co-
infections, increased rate of infections, and prevalence of stigma. 
A number of research studies around the field of interagency collaborations, such as: impacts associated 
with interagency collaborations, reasons behind why organisations collaborate, and the mechanisms of the 
collaborations, have been done and contributed significantly to the development of knowledge in this form of 
service delivery. For instance Bardach (1998) appreciates that collaborative ventures achieve 'public value' 
meaning enhanced productivity, and thereby profitability. 
Regardless of the achievements, Bardach (1998), (Weiss, 1995, cited in Bloomberg, 1997), & Sowa, (2008), 
urge that that there is a gap in people's understanding of, the processes employed by the collaborative 
stakeholders to move from identified needs or problems to collaborative action plans, what the proposed 
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programmes are and how they will work, and extent of resource sharing in collaborations. Nevertheless Bardach 
(1998) urges that in order to succeed, government administrative systems must supply environments which 
enable the talented individuals to practise their knowledge of interagency collaborations and must influence 
personnel and financial resources for these collaborations. 
The aim of this master's research study is to contribute to this growing body of interagency collaboration 
inquiries and understanding by demonstrating how resources are contributed among partner agencies for the 
collaborations, and the extent of the New Zealand government support to interagency relationships, by 
developing a case study of HIV/AIDS control and prevention measures. This study has heavily drawn on 
reference materials from Bardach's book of 1998 'Getting agencies to work together; The Practise and the 
Theory of Managerial Craftsmanship'. 
1.2 Structure of the essay 
Section one covers the general introduction, a statement of the problem; research questions; general 
objectives of the study (including specific objectives); and the methodology. 
Section two covers HIV/AIDS control and prevention measures including an overview of the disease 
worldwide, international guidelines for HIV/AIDS control and prevention measure; general status of HIV/AIDS in 
New Zealand; the government's response towards HIV/AIDS; the inter-organisational relations to control and 
prevent the disease; and the agencies involved in New Zealand. 
Section three discusses an overview and history of interagency collaborations, definitions of key 
concepts, and theories of interagency collaborations. 
Section four discusses the key resources for interagency collaborations, and the reasons why 
agencies may decide to contribute or not to contribute resources for collaborations. 
Section five covers the New Zealand government's administration system support to interagency 
collaborations including management overviews in interagency collaborations, and government factors 
influencing interagency collaborations. 
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Section six covers critical analysis of the research findings including the status of HIV/AIDS; an 
overview of the interagency collaborations to control and prevent HIV/AIDS in New Zealand; government 
administrative system support to interagency collaborations; and resource contributions among the agencies. 
Section seven focuses on the conclusions reached and suggested recommendations. 
1.3 A Problem statement 
Working together at agency level is a critical real-world problem, and is more complicated than it sounds. 
Besides many problems of interagency collaborations, resources for the same are always scarce and 
compromised by selfishness, and agencies' interest to protect their own autonomy. Not only that, but it is also 
difficult to align collaborative efforts in the face of a government administrative system which does not accept and 
or support interagency relationships. This case study analyses critically the practicability of the theory of 
interagency relationships with a focus on resource contributions, and extent of government support towards such 
interagency relationships. 
1.4 Objectives of the Study 
1.4.1 General Objective 
The general objective is to understand the practicability of the theory of interagency collaboration at an 
operational stage by focusing on resource sharing and government support towards agency collaborations, using 
a case study of HIV/AIDS control and prevention measures in New Zealand. 
There are four specific objectives: 
1. To understand the nature and extent of resource contributions such as finance and human 
capital among the collaborating agencies; 
2. To understand sources offunding for the interagency collaborations; 
3. To understand general indications of HIV/AIDS infections in New Zealand, their control and 
prevention measures and the responsible agencies; and 
4. To understand the extent to which the New Zealand government administrative system 
promotes interagency relationships 
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1.5 Research Questions 
Four questions are addressed: 
1. What are the tangible and intangible resources available for interagency collaborations to 
control and prevent HIV/AIDS in New Zealand? 
2. How do the collaborating agencies share these resources? 
3. What government policies facilitate interagency relationships in New Zealand? 
4. What is the general situation with regard to HIV/AIDS in New Zealand? 
1.6 Methodology 
The objectives were pursued through an examination of both the theory and practise of interagency 
collaborations using a case study HIV /AIDS on control and prevention measures in New Zealand. The theory 
part reviewed interagency collaborations in New Zealand and other countries, and information on HIV/AIDS 
control and prevention measures. 
A number of books- mostly Bardach (1989), various journals, and online information - was used to 
extract research information particularly on: HIV/AIDS control and prevention measures both in New Zealand and 
internationally; the nature of resource contributions for interagency collaborations; and extent of the New Zealand 
government support to interagency relationships. Based on my own perspectives, critical arguments are given in 
analysing practicability of the theory. 
The second part covered the practise of interagency collaborations. In the case study, structured 
questionnaires were used to interview government officials involved in implementing collaborative works on 
HIV/AIDS control and prevention measures. The interviews were approved by the Victoria University of 
Wellington(VUW) Human Ethics Committee (HEC). Following an approval from the HEC, letters explicitly 
outlining the study objectives and confidentiality issues, including the schedule of interview questions, were sent 
to the Chief Executives Officer's (CEO's) of the selected agencies, namely the New Zealand AIDS Foundation 
(NZAF), Immigration Services (IS), and the Ministry of Health (MoH). 
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The criteria for selecting the three agencies were the nature of resources (resource independent, 
dependent, or principal, the nature of the agency's relationship within the collaborations (cooperation or 
collaborations), the type of agency (government or non-government), and the agency's level of autonomy in 
development of health policies (policy maker or implementer). 
Using a literature-based conceptual framework of interagency collaborations at operation level to guide 
the investigation, questions centred on resource sharing in interagency collaborations, using the case study 
HIV/AIDS control and prevention measures, and the extent of government support, were directed to the selected 
participants. 
To understand the operation level of interagency collaborations based on resource sharing, and extent 
of government support on agency collaborations, nine face-to-face structured interviews of about sixty minutes 
each, with three participants from each agency were expected. However only one participant per organization 
was granted. 
To maximize the interview opportunities as well as quality data collection, the face-to-face interviews 
were planned to be supported by an audio taping for information back up. However due to various reasons, only 
one face-to-face interview supported by an audio tapping, was carried out. The other two interviews involved a 
telephonic interview with audio taping, and a written answers interview. 
After data collection, perceptions of the participants were interpreted, examined, and discussed 
critically to reveal both the practicability of interagency collaboration theory on resource sharing, and New 
Zealand government support on interagency working relationships. The conclusion reached and 
recommendations made on practicability of interagency collaboration theory on resource sharing as well as 
government support to collaborations are given at the end. 
1.7 Summary of section one 
Interagency collaboration emerged in the 1990s mainly to address structural challenges faced by 
service delivery organisations and to promote better coordination of service delivery in the public sector. The 
interagency collaborative works are said to add public value. 
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However, in spite of the additional value, still there is a gap in people's understanding on the processes 
employed by the agencies to ensure the so called public value. Through structured interviews with three of the 
partner agencies involved in the case study, information on the nature of resource contributions, the status of 
HIV/AIDS in New Zealand, and the extent of government support to inter-organisational relationships was 
gathered. The objective of the study is to contribute to the knowledge of interagency collaboration specifically on 
resource sharing, and the extent of government policy support to collaborative ventures in New Zealand. 
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2 HIV/AIDS 
2.1 Introduction 
This section elaborates the status of HIV/AIDS in New Zealand and worldwide. Further it gives an overview 
of the international guidelines on HIV/AIDS control and prevention measures, it discusses the strategic actions of 
the New Zealand government towards the disease control and prevention, and the agencies involved and their 
programmes for implementing the government actions. 
2.2 An overview of HIV/AIDS worldwide 
AVERT, (2009a) reports that at the end of 2007, HIV/AIDS data of the World Health Organisation and United 
Nations (WHO/UNAIDS) showed that, worldwide, an estimate of 33 million people were living with HIV/AIDS; of 
these, Sub Sahara Africans accounted for 22 million. More than 25 million people have died of AIDS since 1981 
and Africa has 11.6 million AIDS orphans; at the end of 2007, women accounted for 50% of all adults living with 
HIV/AIDS worldwide, and for 59% in sub-Saharan Africa; young people (under 25 years old) accounted for half of 
all new HIV/AIDS infections worldwide; and in developing and transitional countries, 9.7 million people were in 
immediate need of life-saving HIV/AIDS medicines, but of these, only 2.99 million (31 %) were receiving the ARV 
drugs. 
2.3 International guidelines on HIV/AIDS control and prevention measures 
Control and prevention measures of the disease in the in the 21 51 century face many challenges worldwide. 
In the years since its discovery, no single drug has proved to cure the pandemic disease. Health institutions have 
promoted various preventive and control measures, with the result that the number of infections is escalating 
worldwide. In Africa particularly Tanzania, the disease is wiping out working population and is one of the causes 
of slow economic growth. Given the complicated control and prevention measures caused by long term doses; 
co-infections; stigma; and discrimination, the need to develop new modern policies across organisations and 
nations in problem solving is essential. For instance WHO/UNAIDS campaigns strictly for countries to apply the 
'one stop shop' model whereby priority interventions which focus on HIV/AIDS prevention, treatment, and care in 
the health sector are developed and implemented. They advocate for multi-sectoral responses whereby 
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government ministries must participate in HIV/AIDS prevention, care, and support measures at all levels; private 
sector to contribute in cash or kind; NGOs to support prevention programmes in close collaboration with local 
communities; and mass media to promote behaviors and tolerance. 
UNAIDS(2000) report calls for a political response (from low levels to high levels) through advocacy for joint 
actions, financial and human resources provisions, adoption of the most practical interventions, and motivation, 
support, and supervision to all change agents dedicated to HIV/AIDS mitigations. Further, they call for national 
strategic actions which are evidence based methods of HIV/AIDS prevention, care and impact alleviation 
whereby the Ministry of Health (MoH) has to play a critical role of managing the overall national responses. 
2.4 HIV/AIDS in New Zealand 
According to NZAF (2009a) report, the first cases of HIV/AIDS in New Zealand occurred in 1985, starting in 
the community of men who have sex with men (MSM). Later on, the diseases became common among other 
communities including the heterosexual community, and mother to child. The report says the rate of infection is 
increasing annually with an estimate of 184 people per year. According to the MoH (2009), by the end of June 
2009, 70% of HIV/AIDS infected people were MSM. A large proportion of the MSM acquired the disease within 
New Zealand, while the majority of those who acquired it through other contacts (heterosexual contacts, mother 
to child, and all blood transfusion victims) acquired it whilst overseas, mostly from high prevalence countries of 
Africa and South America. 
2.5 New Zealand government response to HIV/AIDS mitigation 
To ensure comprehensive HIV/AIDS control and prevention in New Zealand, the government focuses on the 
most at risk (MAR) populations of MSM, prostitutes, injecting drug users (IDUs), youth, migrants from HIV high 
risk countries, people living with HIV/AIDS, and HIV positive pregnant women (MoH 2003). 
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Prevention measures include: promotion of condom use and clean injecting equipment, treatment of sexually 
transmitted infections (STis), antenatal HIV screening, community based HIV rapid testing and counseling 
services, and safe blood donations. Others measures include best practices such as legalisation of prostitution, 
compulsory education on sexual and reproduction health for all year 7 and 13 students, and provision of special 
residence visas to HIV/AIDS Zimbabweans who fled Mugabe's hostile regime1. 
Treatment measures focus on all New Zealand residents living with HIV/AIDS including HIV positive 
pregnant women who do not have a New Zealand residence permit. The HIV/AIDS patients are supplied with a 
variety of quality ARVs. For example in 2007, more than 18 antiretroviral drugs were fully funded by the 
government, with annual treatment costs reaching NZ$11.8 million. 
2.6 Agencies involved in the control and prevention of HIV/AIDS 
In general the collaborating agencies which are contracted by the MoH are involved in HIV/AIDS-related 
service delivery. This includes the New Zealand AIDS Foundation (NZAF), the Needle Exchange programme, the 
New Zealand Epidemiology Group, New Zealand Blood Services, Pharmac, New Zealand Prostitute Collective, 
and Family Planning. The cooperating agencies include the Ministry of Education (MoE) who provide education 
on sexuality and reproductive health, and the Immigration Service (IS). 
2.6.1 The Ministry of Health 
MoH is the lead agency in the inter-organisational relationship to control and prevent HIV/AIDS. It 
provides strategic leadership, guidance, and frameworks for the disease control and prevention. It uses its 
strategic action plan as a guide during programme development and implementations. It collaborates with the 
NGOs through contracting for services and cooperates with the public organisations such as the IS and Ministry 
of Education (MoE). 
1 A special residence policy based on humanitarian response to the disturbance in Zimbabwe, was introduced for the Zimbabweans who fled the Mug abe 
regime by the New Zealand government in July 2005.The policy aimed to grant residency to all Zimbabweans who qualify to live in New Zealand with the 
objective of protecting the health of New Zealanders and of those Zimbabweans seeking to become New Zealanders; to reduce risks related to HIV and 
AIDS to both the Zimbabweans and New Zealanders; and to make life certain for those who were unable to return back to Zimbabwe and yet were 
unlawfully living in New Zealand. Upon policy announcement, about 500 Zimbabweans turned up, but others did not apply for residence due to uncertainty 
about their HIV status. In August 2006, the government announced a special health waiver for the Zimbabweans covered by the Special Zimbabweans 
Residency Policy. This means the Zimbabweans with HIV and AIDS were also eligible for New Zealand residency. 
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2.6.2 The Immigration Service (IS) 
The IS plays a crucial role by ensuring that all immigrants who want to stay in New Zealand for more that six 
months are tested for HIV/AIDS. This makes the IS a sensitive agency in the HIV/AIDS collaborations as 
migrants rank second from the MSM in terms of infections. The IS joined the interagency relationships to control 
and prevent HIV/AIDS in 2005 when the MoH expressed its concern that a large number of migrants mostly from 
Africa were tested H IV positive in New Zealand and they were causing stress to the public health system. 
Following the discussion, the IS amended the immigration health policy whereby HIV/AIDS testing became 
mandatory for all migrants wishing to stay in New Zealand for more than six months especially those from high 
risk countries of Africa and Asia. According to the IS (2005), the objective of the amendment was to ensure that 
all migrants are able to carry on the task for which they have been granted entry (work or students), are not likely 
to be of danger to the public health, and are unlikely to impose major costs or extra demand for health services 
or special education services in New Zealand. The IS had to appoint a panel of doctors in more than 1,157 (see 
appendix 1.0) countries to carry out the medical checkups. In countries where there is no panel of doctors, the IS 
rely on registered or board certified or licensed practitioners or physicians. 
2.6.3 The New Zealand AIDS Foundation (NZAF) 
NZAF is the largest HIV focused NGO registered with the Charities Commission, and NZAF grew out of 
the MSM initiatives in the 1980s. The escalating rate of HIV infections among the MSM needed close attention 
from the government and this prompted the MoH to contract the NZAF for service delivery for the MSM, 
UNGASS (2007). 
NZAF (2008), indicates that the NZAF strategic plan focuses on preventing transmissions of HIV/AIDS, 
and supporting people affected by HIV/AIDS to maximise their health and well being. Its policies include 
behavioural surveillance of the MSM, effective promotion of sustainable HIV prevention strategies for the MSM 
and other at at risk populations, ensuring that all HIV prevention initiatives are responsive to the most at risk 
populations, reduction of HIV/AIDS incidences, minimisation of stigma and discrimination experienced by people 
living with HIV and AIDS (PLWHA), and significant other Members of the at risk population 
Due to its long term experience of HIV/AIDS compared to others, NZAF is an active agency in the 
interagency relationships to control and prevent HIV/AIDS in New Zealand. 
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2.6.4 Needle Exchange Programme (NEP) 
Exchange of needles was legalised in New Zealand through the initiation of the Health Regulations 
1987 whereby sale of needles and syringes to injecting drug users was decriminalised. The needle exchange 
programme became the first national needle exchange programme in the world, and was initiated after the 
recognition that sharing of needle and syringes among the injecting drug users was one of the most efficient 
method of transmitting HIV and Hepatitis C among drug users (NEP,2009). 
The NEP distributes syringes and needles to drug injectors on a low cost basis (about NZ$ 1 ); and 
recruits some drug injectors to deliver the training on safe drug injection. The results are appealing as the 
proportion of used needles and syringes returned for destruction has increased from 26% in 1994 to 52.6% in 
2000 (Bruton,2004 ). 
In 2004, NEP started a program of 1-4-1 (new for old ) exchange distribution scheme. Before the 1-4-1 
scheme, NEP sale of needles and syringe remained constant and after research they discovered that the drug 
users can reuse the equipment for up to ten times before destruction. 
NEP (2009) claims that, the NEP programme has done well and New Zealand currently enjoys one of 
the lowest rate of HIV infections amongst injecting drug users in the OECD, with only 0.5% of injecting drug 
users are infected. Moreover the proportion of used needles and syringes returned for destruction has increased 
to 90%, following the advertising campaign. 
2.6.5 New Zealand Blood Services (NZBS) 
NZBS is responsible for blood safety and has scientifically based procedures and policies to eliminate 
infectious disease transmissions (such as HIV) in blood transfusion and products. The NZBS distributes blood to 
both private health care providers and District Health Boards (DHBs); each centre has a blood bank. The blood 
services are free for all patients, although a modest fee applies to the receiving health centres. 
To ensure safety of the donated blood, donors who have a history of male to male sexual acts, HIV high 
risk activities (such as being a partner of someone who has participated in high risk activities), and/or have had 
body tattoos within the past six months, are not allowed to donate blood (NZBS, 2007). 
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2.6.6 New Zealand Prostitute Collective (NZPC) Programme 
According to NZPC (2008) the programme was formed in 1987 by sex workers with the objective of 
seeking equal rights for the sex workers including human rights, health and well-being of the sex workers. A year 
later, it signed a permanent contract with the MoH to provide a range of services to sex workers by focusing on 
HIV/AIDS prevention measures. 
Due to police harassment to sex workers at times during programme implementation, it became difficult 
to deliver the contracted services. Soon later following an outcry of NZPC staff and long advocacy of various 
stakeholders, prostitution was decriminalised in 2003. 
2.6.7 AIDS Epidemiology Group (AEG) 
The AEG was established in 1989 at the department of Preventive and Social Medicine, University of 
Otago funded by the MoH and Health Research Council. Since its inception, AEG has been responsible for 
national surveillance on HIV/AIDS infections in New Zealand. The main objectives of AEG are: to contribute to a 
wider understanding about HIV/AIDS; to monitor the HIV/AIDS epidemic in New Zealand through on-going 
observation; and where needed, development of new methods of HIV monitoring and evaluations (AEG,2008). 
The AEG has been an active provider of up-to date reports which give a view of the national HIV/AIDS situation 
twice a year. 
2.6.8 Family Planning Association (FPA) programme 
The FPA is focused at ensuring that people have positive views about sexuality and are able to make 
informed choices about their sexual and reproductive health and well being. According to FPA (2007), they 
provide a range of services including contraception, testing for STI's and their treatment. Other services are 
health promotion services such as the provision of workshops on adolescent sexuality and education on sexual 
and reproductive health for primary and health care professionals. 
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2.6.9 Other HIV And AIDS supporting programmes 
Other agencies involved in the interagency relationship to control and prevent HIV/AIDS include Mental 
Health Foundation (MHF), Drug Foundation, Ministry of Social Development (MSD), District Health Boards 
(DHBs), Ministry of Education, Pharmac, Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the media. 
2.7 Summary 
HIV/AIDS is a worldwide threat and has left a number of people in desperate conditions such as 
orphans and widows. WHO/UNAIDS and the Ottawa Charter, advocate for joint actions across and within nations, 
as the key important guidelines for control and prevention of the disease. 
Until June 2009, a total number of 3,192 people or 0.075% of the population in New Zealand were living 
with HIV/AIDS. This proportion is not as high as that of other nations. AVERT (2009) shows that 23.9% of adult 
Boatswains, 11% of South Africans, and 26.5% of Swazilandians live with HIV/AIDS. The New Zealand MoH has 
developed plausible national strategic action plans for HIV/AIDS whereby, through the public health centres and 
contracting for services, a number of HIV/AIDS programmes are in place including those of the public 
organisations such as that of the IS and the MoE. 
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3 DEFINITION OF KEY CONCEPTS, AN OVERVIEW, HISTORY, AND THEORIES OF INTERAGENCY 
COLLABORATION 
3.1 Introduction 
This section covers an overview, and history of interagency collaborations, the definitions of key 
concepts used in interagency collaborations using the HIV/AIDS case study, and the theories of interagency 
collaborations. 
3.2 An overview of interagency collaborations 
Modern and sound state policies aimed at promoting development are, in most cases, developed by 
harmonising various cross-sectoral priority issues. The harmonisation process includes, but is not limited to, 
consideration and incorporation of the priority cross-sectoral and cross-cutting issues into policy design, 
implementation, monitoring, and evaluation. The harmonisation happens when a sector understands and values 
the positive linkages it has with other sectors; that is, when it prioritises its sectoral issues;, the cross-sectoral 
and cross-cutting priority issues are also considered and mainstreamed into the policy processes. 
At the same time that consideration is needed for overall harmonisation, each sector needs accurate 
data and systematic problem solving to jointly plan and coordinate the issues effectively. In most cases, the task 
of coordinating priority issues is difficult for any one sector to address. Thus, through a number of processes, 
actions and steps, the different sectors find themselves working together, either informally or formally to create 
public value. When the agencies work together to add public value through formal arrangements, such inter-
organisational relationships are called "interagency collaborations" (Bardach, 1998). 
Ryan and Gill (2008), & IPS (2008) state that, prior to the formalisation of interagency collaborations to 
address the jointly perceived issues, the agencies may have started joint works through communication and/or 
resource sharing. The continued resource sharing and joint tasks, commitments, and the degree of trust and 
equality, tend to change the relationships along different continuums. These continuums include stages of co-
existence, cooperation, coordination, collaboration and service integration, on the one hand, and simple to 
complex inter-organisational relationships, on the other (see figure no.1 ). Moreover, scholars (Salmon, 1995 cited 
in Sowa, 2008),& IPS (2008) urge that for the agencies to collaborate, they need a longer period of time for joint 
14 
projects accompanied by resource sharing to allow understanding of each other's potentiality, to build trust, to 
become creative, to share common understanding over the problem, and to become more committed to pre-set 
goals. 
IPS (2008) says that none of the aforementioned inter-organisational relationships is inherently superior 
over another; rather the nature of the work involved, and the desired goals determine the most appropriate 
approach. Of the approaches, collaboration seems to be more commonly used when dealing with 'wicked' issues 
(too many multidimensional problem causes), whereby no single agency can claim to have the information and 
or resources to address the issue on its own, only through joined efforts across various agencies, for instance 
those with the 'piece of jigsaw' (knowledge and resource) over the problem tend to address it. Pathfinder (2003) 
& Walker (2002) urge that the collaborations are characterised by having common goals, formal relationships, 
supporting secretariat, and shared policies or practise. 
The IPS,(2008) says, within a single interagency relationship, there could be a mix of more than one 
relationship, as a single collaborative venture may comprise coordination, cooperation, and collaboration working 
relationships. (Gray, 1989, cited in Walker, 2006), urges that what are often referred to as interagency 
collaborations between agencies for delivering services, can be a number of different inter-organisational 
relationships ranging from cooperation, coordination, to collaboration. This is really confusing. Some scholars 
urge that collaboration develops from cooperation and coordination, yet within collaboration, others say there 
could be coordination and cooperation. To make it clear and to reduce ambiguity, the proper term for all three 
relations, could be inter-organisational relationships, and this report has tried to use the term. 
Bardach, (1998) urges that, the collaborations are not necessary initiated by top managers, even middle 
managers can initiate unofficially, and once successful, it can be approved by executives and become a formal 
interagency collaborations. IPS, (2008) urges that success of collaboration has strong correlation with the 
characters of the initiator. The initiator must have appropriate personalities, skills and competencies; must be 
good at forming diverse social networks between public, NGOs, and community organisations; must be focused 
at outcomes and not the organisation's mission; and must able to use the perspective of the client or citizen as a 
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reference framework for initiating the collaboration. This is true, but in most cases, the initiators are few in 
number and even the few do not last long in any one agency, they are always subject to relocation. 
Collaborative works can happen at different levels such as at policy level, organisational level, program 
level, and client level. For example, collaboration at program level focuses on improving operations of the 
programs being delivered in an organization, while collaborations at policy levels focus on improving the structure 
and operations of a policy field as a whole, (Kagan, 1993, cited in Sowa, 2008). 
Three models namely markets, hierarchies, and networks are used to characterize and analyse the way 
interagency collaborations occurs. (Frances et al1991 cited in Walker 2002), urges that the market model is said 
to coordinate under the 'invisible hand' of price system in market exchange; hierarchies work through 
authoritative administrative systems that organize linkages between component parts; and networks coordinates 
through political, social and economical relationships that cross the boundaries of established organisational 
units. The hierarchy model is said to have a 'head' that has authority to make decisions on behalf of the partner 
agencies (top down method) or has capacity to issue instructions, the network model requires consultation and 
consensus building, persuasion, establishment of supportive relationships to define and sustain their common 
grounds on which to act jointly and achieve benefits for its members. Meanwhile both the network and hierarchy 
models are often successfully and jointly used by governments. 
Different theories have tried to explain reasons behind success of collaborative works. Bardach (1998) 
discusses three theories namely, Craftsman's theory based on capacity of the agencies as a dependant variable 
for successful collaborations; resource theory based on resources as the determinant factor for collaboration; 
and Networking theory based on communication capacity as a dependable variable to successful collaboration. 
Of the three theories, Bardach, agrees with craftsman's theory due its diversity in analysis. The theory allows two 
different and complementing forms of casual analysis i.e. the difference in degree of success across a number of 
cases, and the qualitative understanding of various aspects of the materials used in the collaboration, the 
process of collaboration, and the end results of collaboration. 
IPS, (2008), Pathfinder,(2003), Walker, (2006) ,& NTAECSC,(2008) urge that success of Interagency 
collaboration depends on a number of factors including accountability and transparency level, availability and 
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contribution of resources, agency creativity and innovations, evaluation, leadership and management style, 
external factors such as policy or government changes, and financial management. Resource limitation tends to 
prevent implementation of collaborative ventures because initial arrangements of collaboration may have passed, 
but the unwillingness of partners to contribute resources, may tend to prevent implementation of the collaborative 
activities. Bardach, (1998), urges that resources for interagency collaborations such as problem domain 
(clienteles), budget, and autonomy are always at crisis, and agencies do not want to loose control over such 
resources for fear that their organisational mission will be compromised. 
Even if the above factors are not the case, collaborations can be unrewarding if the partner agencies do 
not trust each other. Bardach ( 1998 p.4) urges that trusting each other means an expectation that the actor can 
be relied on to fulfill obligations, can behave in predictable manner, and can act and negotiate fairly when 
possibility of opportunism is present. As the trust increases, the agencies become more willing to take risks and 
act together in confidence with less worries of being disadvantaged. With less trust, the willingness to take risks 
and cooperate decreases, and the likelihood of betrayal, along with the need to defend individual agency 
interests, increases. To reduce the problem of mistrust, Bardach emphasizes that, the agencies need to establish 
a system of interpersonal culture of trust and pragmatism together with a system for building and maintaining 
consensus at the executive, or policy levels; and they need time, efforts, skills, and a mix of constructive 
personalities who are around for a long time to establish an effective collaborative relationship. 
3.3 An outline of history of interagency collaboration in New Zealand 
In general interagency collaborations became popular after repeated failures in delivering social 
services mostly from 1980s to mid 1990s. Apart from that, (Salamon, 1998, cited in Sowa, 2008) urges that 
governance trends in 21st century focus more on managing for and sharing for outcomes rather than outputs due 
to the recognition that often agencies contribute to shared outcomes. The recognition of shared outcomes among 
agencies has made local agencies to engage more in coordination (policy development and service delivery) so 
as to achieve their goals, making interagency collaboration more popular. 
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Bloomberg, (1997), urges that in the USA, interagency collaborations became popular due to 
fragmentation of several social services where there was lack of coordination and integration approaches to 
service delivery, whereby the Health, Welfare and Education sectors were more affected. (Richardson, 1972 p. 
20 cited in Bloomberg, 1997), claims that, the situations in USA called for joint communication, joint planning 
among the agencies, coordinated program operations, and a comprehensive system of dealing with the people. 
In New Zealand Interagency collaboration became an important strategy of the governance 
mechanisms since the election of the Labour led government in 1999 where the government experienced two 
waves of reforms. Stace and Cumming, (2006) & Whitcombe, (2008) urge that the intention of the reforms were 
to ensure public sector delivers quality services, become innovative and accountable, but instead, the reforms 
brought a lot of stress to the public sector and one of the consequences was the fragmentation of sectors 
including isolation of departments and ministries, thereby causing inefficiencies, lack of policy co-ordination, and 
duplications. 
Walker, (2006), says, the Labour-led government soon after election in 1999, took a critical look at the 
achievements of the NPM reforms, and it became more concerned about cohesiveness, consistency, 
constructive relationships, and shared values across the government sectors. Whitcombe, (2008), & Walker, 
(2006), urge that departments were advised to work together in constructive ways in order to achieve 
government goals, to improve service delivery, and to manage for shared outcomes. 
The Steering Group and Managing for Outcomes Roll-Out 2003/04,(2002) in Lewis (2007), says government 
departments were required report on the linkages they have with other departments' outputs and the intended 
government outcomes. Lewis,( 2007) says that to ensure the outcomes, ministers are required to contract for 
outputs which contribute to the outcomes, and are held accountable for the outcomes, whereas the Chief 
Executives are more accountable for the delivery by their departments of specific services. 
3.4 Definition of concepts 
3.4.1 Interagency collaborations 
Warmington et al, (2004) defines interagency collaboration as 'when more than one agency is working 
together at a strategic or operational level, in a planned and formal way, rather than simply through informal 
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networking (although the latter may support and develop the former). Gray(1989 p. 5) defines it as "a procedure 
through which parties who seeks different aspects of a problem can constructively explore their differences and 
search for solutions that go beyond their own limited vision of what is possible". 
Bardach (1998 p. 8) says " is any joint activity by two or more agencies working together with the 
intention of increasing public value by having the agencies working together rather than separately", 
(Gray and Wood, 1991 cited in Bardach, 1998) says "interagency collaboration occurs when a group of 
autonomous stakeholders of problem domain engage in an interactive process, using shared rules, norms and 
structures, to act or decide on issues related to that domain". Gray (1985) says "is the pooling of appreciations 
and or tangible resources such as information, money, and labour by two or more stakeholders to solve a set of 
problems which neither can solve individually". Mattessich and Monsey ((1992 p.7) cited in Bloomberg, 1997) 
says that "is a mutually beneficial and well defined relationship entered into by two or more organisations to 
achieve common goals including commitment to a definition of mutual relationships and goals, joint developed 
structures and shared responsibility, mutual authority and accountability for success, sharing of resources and 
rewards". 
Bloomberg ( 1997) says "Is a mutually beneficial and well defined relationship entered into by two or 
more organisations to achieve common goals including commitment to a definition of mutual relationships and 
goals, joint developed structures and shared responsibilities, mutual authority and accountability for success, and 
sharing of resources and rewards". 
cooperation "is the relationship between management and staff in different organization, characterised 
by informality and lack of formal structure, and coordination involves multiple organisations working together to 
coordinate their services, yet remain fundamentally independent from each other; and collaboration is where 
organisations share resources and rewards", (Kagan, 1991 cited in Sowa, 2008), 
(Hallet al, 1977 cited in policy quarterly, 2006), says cooperation "is the extent to which organisations 
attempt to ensure that their activities take into account those of other organisations while coordination is 
characterised by informal trade-offs and by attempts to establish reciprocity in the absence of rules". 
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Generally the definitions of collaborations are convincing. However Mattessich's and Monsey's 
definition is more coherent due to inclusion of resource sharing, commitments, and mutual accountability. 
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3.4.2 Resources 
Gray, ( 1985) says collaborative resources are the means by which several stakeholders who are 
involved in collaborations (both the individual groups and the organisations that are directly influenced by the 
actions of the others within the domain) use to achieve constructive resolution of the problem. 
Bardach, (1998) urges resources are 'an available supply that can be drawn on, when needed; the 
ability to deal with a difficult or troublesome situation effectively; means that can be used to cope with a difficult 
situation; the total means available for economic and political development, such as mineral wealth, labour force, 
and armaments; or the total means available to a company for increasing production or profit, including plant, 
labour, and raw material'. 
3.4.3 HIV and AIDS 
WH0,(2010), defines HIV means as " Human Immune deficiency Virus which is a retro-virus 
that infects cells of the immune system by destroying or impairing their functions". As the infection progresses, 
the immune system becomes weaker, and the person becomes more susceptible to infections and develop AIDS 
(Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome ) which is the most advanced stage of HIV infection. The person can 
delay exposure to AIDS (10-15years) through use of ARVs, but at the end the patients die either due to ARVs 
complications or other diseases due to lack of AI OS cure to date. 
The HIV is transmitted through unprotected sexual intercourse (anal or vaginal), transfusion of 
contaminated blood, sharing of contaminated needles and or other contaminated hospital facilities, and between 
an infected mother and her infant during pregnancy, childbirth, and breastfeeding. 
AVERT, (2009b) on theories of HIV claims that, AIDS is believed to emerge in the early 1980s and the 
first cases were observed from the gay men in New York and California USA. Other theory claims that the origin 
of the disease or the virus is thought to be from Africa (Southern Cameroon). 
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3.4.4 Public value 
Moore, (2004) defines public value as, "the managerial success in the public sector in initiating and 
reshaping public sector enterprises in ways that increase their value to the public in both the short and long run; 
sometimes this means increasing efficiency, effectiveness, or fairness in currently defined missions; other times, 
it means introducing programs that respond to new political aspirations or meet a new need in the organization's 
task environments so that old capabilities can be used more responsibly and effectively; on occasions it means 
reducing the claims that government organisations make on tax payers and reclaiming the resources now 
committed to the organisations for alternative public or private uses". 
Bardach,(1998) says "Is the achievement of the politically authorized mission of the organization, and 
the fulfilment of the citizen desires that were more or less reproduced in that authorization and in the third part 
organisations, public value means the achievements of its social purposes and the satisfaction of the donors' 
desires to contribute to the cause that the organization embodies". Bryson, (1988) says "is the tangible order 
when faith is followed by enactment or is the greater achievement of the organization's goals and heightened 
stakeholder satisfaction. Moore, (2000) says is the value proposition embodied in strategic plans as the plans 
move from being a hypothetical story to being a true story through effective implementation. Alford, (2001) says 
"is the provision of legal framework which underpins laws and orders as well as providing the pre-conditions for 
the operation of the market such as reinforcing property rights and contracts. 
The word public value has different perceptions by different sectors. Moore, (2000) urges that, in the for-
profit sector, public value means, the financial returns delivered to the shareholders, and use value delivered to 
customers, and the value is well measured by financial performance which is described by financial statements, 
whereas in the public sector, public value means, changes in social conditions such as improved health or 
security. 
3.5 Theories of interagency collaborations 
3.5.1 Craftsman Theory 
The theory focuses on 'capacity' of an organization to collaborate as a dependent variable to a 
successful interagency collaboration. First the theory appreciates that collaboration is a set of acts or activities 
which different agencies engage in to solve shared problems. However, according to Bardach,(1998), the 
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theory urges that the collaboration does not need the actual implementation of the planned activities to be 
termed as collaborative work, but even the initial arrangements alone such as mutual agreements, have social 
value. 
The said value is the potential change in individual's attitude, behaviours or peace of mind, once they 
recognize existence of the joint services of the agencies. Thus the theory emphasizes that, it is potential to 
engage in interagency collaboration relationships, even if the implementation stage is uncertain, for it is the 
existence of the interagency collaboration which is most important to the public. For example, an understanding 
that environmental enforcement agencies acting collaboratively may detect and punish offenders, is not of great 
value than the restriction capacity the offenders fear to test; or the understanding that fire department will provide 
joint help in an emergency, is of more value everyday to the surrounding community, than the value they will give 
to the agency in the day the agency offers mutual aid when conditions require them either once in a year or ten 
years. 
The theory's argument is very practical and rational, due to its application to the case study of 
interagency relationships to control and prevent HIV/AIDS in New Zealand. For instance, by knowing that 
Immigration Services requires HIV/AIDS testing as a policy to qualify for a New Zealand visa, or residence permit, 
applicants may fear to engage in risk sexual behaviours to avoid HIV contaminations, or those who are not sure 
of their HIV statuses, may not be ready to risk their money and time for visa and or residence applications. 
Bardach (1998, pg. 21) claims that craftsman's theory believes that, the interagency collaborative 
capacity is as an agency itself with conventional agency system inside it such as an operating system, an 
overhead and control system, and a decision making system. The theory urges, that the collaborative capacity 
has five important good features namely: subjective and objective components whereby the objective component 
includes all various administrative services which will support the collaboration, while the subjective component is 
mainly the mutual trust among the agencies that each partner is capable of, committed to, and ready to engage 
in the collaborative work; variation is the exact nature of the capacity depending on the nature of the task, the 
agencies or the intention in question, and in most cases the capacity can fit a multitude of tasks without involving 
further principles; flexibility of the capacity which can start by organizing division of labour, followed by quite 
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easy tasks, and then more challenging tasks which may involve pooling of resources to archive production; ability 
of the capacity to understand authorities within the trans-organisational system such as readiness to support, 
commit resources, and govern the collaboration; and the quantity and quality of the collaborative work which is 
measured by 'how much?' and 'how good?' standards, although the second one is in most cases ignored when 
evaluating collaborative works. 
Bardach urges that, craftsman's theory is acceptable for it allows variation in degree of success across 
various cases as well as the qualitative understanding of the technical materials, process and product of the 
process. However Bardach warns that, the theory is based on estimation. For example, the case of subjective 
component, the capacity is a state of mind which is difficult to measures from outside and it is complex to 
measure the state of mind which changes with the identity of the players who owns the mind. 
The capacity of the agencies is fundamental to successful collaborations. With limited capacity, the 
collaborative efforts are useless. For instance, the first feature objective and subjective are crucial to 
collaboration, as administrative power (objective) including management, financial and human resources, 
initiates and implement collaborative activities; and communication channels at all levels of the agencies, allows 
exchange of information and feed backs, and consistence. Nevertheless, the subjective component is even more 
crucial, for without trust, even with the administrative capacity in place, no agency will be ready to engage in 
collaboration or the collaborative efforts will not be rewarding. 
Nevertheless, the capacity to understand authorities within the trans-organisational system, is also vital 
in ensuring successful collaboration, for it allows an understanding of the different philosophical and ideological 
backgrounds of the organisations thereby identifying and effectively addressing the jointly perceived problems. 
Apart from the criticism that the theory is based on estimation, it is also limited by the fact that, it did not 
take into account the issue of governance structure which is a foundation for successful interagency 
collaborations within a nation. NTAECSC (2008) urges that, the governance structure focuses at clarifying and 
addressing agency's roles, visioning, mutual accountability and transparency, policy and practise changes, and 
strategic planning, which the agencies need most to ensure their collaborative works are rewarding and 
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sustainable. For example, the New Zealand governance system is highly focused on performance measurement 
and managing for outcomes, and this has become a support to interagency collaborations in New Zealand today. 
3.5.2 Resource Dependency Theory: 
The theory claims that, dependency for resources attracts interagency collaborations. The proponent of 
the theory believes that in most cases agencies value autonomy and avoids collaborations. Bardach (1998) & 
NTAECSC (2008) urge that if the resource base of the focal agency depends on the resources of the others, it is 
likely to engage in collaboration more easily for it is assured of social legitimacy or some kinds of rewards. 
Bardach ( 1998) finds that the resource theory claims that, as the gains from collaboration such as 
revenue, and legitimacy dishes-up value creation and concurrent protection of agency's goals, as well as 
opening up windows for agency's managers to use the additional resources for various organisational purposes, 
resource dependency pre-determines the interagency collaboration relationships. 
The major limitation of the theory according to Bardach (1998) is that although it predicts collaboration 
basing on resources, it does not say whether the efforts will be fruitful or not; or what the agencies will regard as 
success. Nor, when there are reasonable agencies for collaboration, which one the focal agency will turn to. 
Moreover, he rejects the theory on the ground that firstly, it is not common for public sector agencies to rush for 
collaborations which are resource dependency-risk; secondly, managers seeking to create public value through 
collaboration, do not use resource dependency as the criteria for engaging in collaborations, instead the resource 
dependency follows later after the collaboration has been established; and thirdly, for successful collaborations, 
the resources must go hand in hand with other key factors such as the emergence of a common vision,. mutual 
trust, and the technical capacity to ensure effective use of the resources. 
The resource theory is applicable due to its relevancy to the case study of HIV/AIDS. In the case study, 
the MoH is the focal agency, and although it gives financial resources to others (NZAF, Needle exchange Group, 
AIDS Epidemiology) through contracting for services, it also depends on such organisations for human resources 
who have long term field experience, and are rich in information and knowledge of HIV/AIDS management. In 
other words there is a mutual dependency between the provider and the principal agency. 
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To some extent the theory is limited because it does not discuss the impact of the resource-rich 
agencies on the relationships. It is common to have more powerful agencies in a collaborating team and such 
agencies tend to take control over the problem domain because they can. Gray (1985) urges that you cannot 
avoid having some stakeholders who have more strong decision-making power over the problem domain, 
whereas less resourceful stakeholders tend to become dependent on, and vulnerable to, the actions of the 
stronger stakeholders. However, Gray warns that the power imbalance limits collaborative efforts as effective 
collaborations cannot take place unless the key stakeholders possess at least equal capability in managing the 
problem domain. 
Moreover, the theory did not discuss the depth of the inter-organisational relationships in relation to the 
extent of resource dependency. According to Van de Ven (1979 cited in Gray, 1985), with more resources to 
depend on, the inter-organisational structure is greatly formalised, whereas with less resources to depend on, a 
loosely organised exchange of information becomes adequate. 
The theory does not state what happens when there are many reasonable agencies for collaborations 
(which one the focal agency turn to), however according to my own perspective, when there is more than one 
plausible collaborator, the focal agency is likely to turn to all collaborators as long as they all fit the purpose. It 
depends on the interagency collaboration capacity of the agency, and it is possible for an agency to share 
resources from more than one source so long as it can meet the agreed performance expectations. 
Nevertheless, the criticism that the theory does not take into account the fact that resource sharing goes 
hand in hand with other key factors (such as trust, and technical capacity to ensure effective collaboration) is also 
agreed. Bardach (1998) urges that the existence of strategic management, mutual trust, and a culture of 
pragmatism ensures that the environments support the agencies to utilize the resources easily and constructively 
to produce the public value. 
3.5.3 Network Theory: 
According to Bardach (1998) the Network theory claims that with good communication capacity, 
relationships can emerge, sustain, and create value for the participants and the society at large. The theory 
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sustains the view that participants engage in networking for the sake of product marketing, advocacy, 
socialisation and service delivery purposes. The network enables participants to easily search for partners whose 
productive capacities are likely to be of use to themselves. Participants who want their potentialities to be 
discovered by others within the network, advertise their potentialities. The theory believes that, the networking 
relationships can form and dissolve quickly without involving suffers delays or costs of formalisation. However, 
for the success of the network, it is important for the participants to be motivated to network and there must be an 
element of trust. Further Bardach urges that apart from various networks, in relation to interagency collaborations, 
the network theory claims only two main networks namely an interagency implementing network, and a 
production network. 
According to (Morgan et all, 1996 cited in Bardach (1998), the interagency implementing networks have 
a set of individuals who carry out the daily operations within the constraints set by the various agencies. The 
individuals design a system which smoothes the daily operations by overcoming problems the partners face. The 
partners can use various systems of work including regular formal meetings by the working groups or a 
committee of middle managers, established budget and personnel, and work schedules, the use of telephone 
calls to solve emergence cases that are already fairly well coordinated, and up-front planning together when 
rapid organisational change is foreseen. 
The interagency production networks are said to be organisations and not individuals. The categories of 
the production relationships include markets (buyers, producers, customers, service providers) or professionals 
sharing expertise, information and authority to manage things better. Key factors such as social bonds, similar 
cultures, and mutual trust of the production partners enables quick understandings of their production networks, 
and users can easily protect themselves against opportunists without suffering delays and formal contracting. 
The theory claims that in the private sector the production network relationship is judged by money, 
while in the public sector, it is mediated either by contracts, memorandum of understandings, personal 
commitment or based on tradition; and where partners are separated geographically, the major means of 
communication are: a common information system, accepted referrals, or location of personnel on common sites, 
to facilitate customers. 
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Although the networking theory is based on effective communication as a basis for successful 
collaborations, it is criticised on the ground that, it does not guarantee effectiveness of the networked 
collaborations. Powel (1990, cited in Bardach, 1998) urges that the theory did not take into account factors such 
as motivation, and competence which are crucial in managing the network; it ignored the issue of leadership 
roles for peer monitoring and coordination duties; and it neglected the aspect of hierarchy such as the division of 
labour, and differentiation of tasks which guarantee performance. 
The theory's claim - that communication capacity determines successful collaborations - is supported. 
This is because the capacity to communicate includes ability of the agencies to appropriately and effectively use 
the communication tools to share the learning, understandings, and exchange of feed back to ensure successful 
collaborations. 
The criticism by Powel (1990) that the theory ignored leadership and role differentiation and division of 
labour, is also supported. To engage in collaboration without role differentiation and division of labour, means 
duplication of efforts which results into wastage of resources. Bardach ( 1998) argues that for successful 
collaborations, agencies need to specialise and integrate as through utilising specialisation and integration to 
create public value, there is division of labour. 
3.6 Summary 
When agencies work together to provide a solution for a single task, different inter-organisational 
relationships are likely to occur, including cooperation, coordination, and collaboration. The words "public value" 
in general means increased effectiveness and efficiency. For instance, in the public sector, it means change in 
social condition such as improved health, while in the private sector it means the financial returns delivered to the 
shareholders, and use value delivered to customers. Resources are means used to achieve constructive 
resolution of the problem, and HIV/AIDS implies weakened immune system of a person. 
Interagency collaboration has three important theories which proclaim that successful interagency 
collaboration is either determined by agency's collaboration capacity, resource dependency, or communication 
capacity. Of the three theories, collaboration capacity theory (Craftsman theory) is more accredited for it allows 
differences in degree of achievements across a number of cases, and it understands the quality of the technical 
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materials, the processes, and the products of these processes which interagency collaborations undergo to 
produce the public value. The resource theory is applicable but it is limited by the fact that resources alone 
cannot ensure successful collaboration, and it is not resources that motivate public agencies to engage in 
collaborations, rather resources come in later. The network theory is somehow valid for successful interagency 
collaborations, but it is limited by the fact that it ignored key factors for successful collaborations such as division 
of labour, leadership role for peer monitoring and coordination, and motivation and competence of the partners in 
ensuring effective communication. 
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4 RESOURCES FOR INTERAGENCY COLLABORATION 
4.1 Introduction 
This section discusses key resources for Interagency relationships including turf, autonomy, money, and 
personnel. It further discusses the key factors which determine flow of resources among the agencies. 
4.2 An overview of resources for interagency collaborations 
Bardach (1998) claims that, the major resources of greatest consequence in collaboration are namely 
turf (problem domain, or client), autonomy, and money. Others include personnel, information, and political 
standing. , The first four resources were focused on in this research. 
Walker (2006 urges that resource sharing in collaborative work tend to strengthens the relationship and 
move the relation from simple to complex, informal to formal, or from co-existence to collaboration. 
IPS (2008) emphasises that for successful collaborations, each member agency need to be treated as 
being equally potential in terms of resources, information or influence to define and address the issues of 
concern. If one agency has more resources than others, in order to avoid diminishment of contributions others 
can make, the more powerful agency should be willing to share power and resources among the group in a way 
that will not create dependency or patronage. The argument is good, but being less resourceful implies low 
capacity to negotiate, fulfil the financial obligations, and supply the necessary information. This means low 
capacity automatically reduces the influence of a less resourceful agency over the interagency collaborative 
venture. This is supported by Bardach (1998) who urges that agencies that are over-involved in crises such as 
financial, poor leadership, and or having internal disagreement are likely to negotiate less equally with other 
partners. 
Vogel et a/ (2007) states that resources are said to be the key limiting factor in commencing 
collaborative projects due to selfishness of the agencies, and scarcity of the resources themselves. He says that, 
on one hand, some collaborative projects may die due to limited resources, and on the other hand, other projects 
tend to advance even further following a period of resource constraints simply because when faced with resource 
difficulties, the partner agencies tend to be more innovative, and creative in searching for new resource sources. 
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Bardach, (1998), urges that three factors namely: careerist, bureaucratic, and value oriented purposes 
determine flow of resources among the agencies. The factors tend to promote the agencies to contribute 
resources or tend to discourage the agencies from contributing resources for collaborations; and the factors tend 
to reinforce each other. 
4.3 Key resources for interagency relationships 
4.3.1 Turf/problem domain/clientele population 
'Turf' means the problem domain or the clients to be served. Bardach (1998) urges that turf is more 
essential than money, for it is the problem domain which is used to justify the reason for budget allocation, and 
not budget allocations which justify the problem domain. Where the clientele population is inadequate, the 
interagency collaboration capacity (ICC) as well as the individual agencies themselves tend to take hold of the 
clienteles and this brings stress to the collaboration. 
Vogel et a/, (2007) notes that where agencies are rooted in different fields, turf wars are less likely to 
occur due to diversity of their activities. His argument agrees with that of Bardach (1998), who claims that for 
effective collaboration, agencies need to specialise and integrate. Combining the two arguments, this implies that 
differentiation avoids tension for the turf. 
4.3.2 Money 
Next to turf, another key resource is money. The money may come from either the agency's budget or 
grants, or through commercialization of agency's services. Bardach (1998) comments that in most cases, when 
public agencies collaborate with each other, they don't use physical money, rather money in the form of 
personnel, information, and facilities; whereas when they collaborate with private agencies, transactions involving 
money are inevitable and is sometimes given under legally binding contracts. The resource money itself can be a 
key reason for terminating, delaying, or avoiding collaborative relationships, simply because the agencies tend to 
be selfish - either by withholding the potential funds, or by hiding information about the existence of funding 
opportunities. 
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4.3.3 Autonomy/authority/legitimacy 
James(1989 cited in Bardach, 1998) says that autonomy in inter-organisational relationships means the 
freedom with which the partner agencies can make decisions without limits and prior consultation with the 
partners, or without the need to give an excuse after a decision. To avoid the misuse of power, Gray (1985) 
emphasizes that before initiating any collaboration, the critical consideration is to analyse which agencies have 
the perceived rights and capacity (legitimate stake) to participate in the development process. The legitimate 
power can be the expertise over the problem, financial, and or information resources. 
Bardach (1998) also says that the extent of autonomy goes hand in hand with the resource capacity of the 
agency (money, information, knowledge, staff), thus a less resourceful agency is likely to be less powerful in 
negotiations and the reverse is true. To play a fair role in decision making, Bardach emphasizes that a low-
powered agency may need to use advocacy (coalition building) before becoming legitimate. 
Stace and Cumming (2006) believe that collaborations are more likely to happen where the involved 
agencies are confident about their autonomies; and that where agencies with mixed confidences are involved, 
collaboration is unlikely. Gray (1985) says that with mixed levels of confidences agencies tend to avoid the 
legitimacy of others, and focus on perception that "each one of us has equal right to participate". If one agency · 
perceives the other as a threat to its legitimacy, the collaboration may fail. To avoid the differences of power 
perceptions Levin and White (1961 cited in Gray, 1985), emphasise that agencies must empower the goals and 
the methods of each other, instead of concentrating on power differences. 
Autonomy can be expressed by leadership and management styles. To avoid the same problems of 
dominance, Pathfinder (2003) states that the leadership and management styles need to be modified with 
creativity to avoid annoyance to any of its members; need to be active, open and consultative to avoid risks of 
non- flourishing collaborations; need to use analytical skills which can lead to consensus on the best intervention 
approaches; need influencing skills such as ability to sell an idea and to be seen as honest and transparent with 
no hidden agendas; need facilitation skills including an ability to create a formal and positive atmosphere; and 
need organisational planning skills. 
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Based on the aforementioned arguments, the management and leadership styles are highly supported. 
With leadership and management skills, the powerful agency can still act as a dominant agency due to their 
professional skills, the less resourceful agencies may not have such skills and therefore be unable to influence 
the joint ventures. The power dominance is even more expressed when the principal needs to ensure 'funds for 
services" as he is held accountable for the outcomes of the collaborative ventures. 
4.3.4 Personnel 
Agencies in inter-organisational relationships tend to rely on their staff for human resources and staff 
tend to remain in their usual workplace. However, where there is a coordinating centre especially for the case of 
networked inter-organisational relationship, or where the collaborative venture is new to the agencies, particular 
staff may be shifted from their work places or hired from outside to enable the collaboration. 
In general, for successful interagency collaborations, there are key personnel who need to be around to 
guide the collaboration. IPS (2008) names the key personnel as lead persons, or initiators/catalysts. These 
personnel are said to have either expertise, great sympathy, and or influence over the problem domain, or 
leadership skills for steering the course. However such personnel are limited within agencies. Bardach ( 1998) 
notes that due to their limited number, key personnel are relocated from time to time and the relocation tends to 
disrupt the interagency collaborations processes as the new personnel take time to understand the system 
thoroughly. 
4.4 Factors determining the flow of collaborative resources among the agencies 
4.4.1 Value creating purpose 
Avoidance purpose: Bardach (1998) claims there are five key factors which are likely to prevent an 
agency from contributing its resources for the sake of protecting its value. First, an agency may fear that if it 
contributes its resources for collaborations, its unique goal/mission, which it is mandated by the legislature and 
which it embraces for a long time, the agency may undergo some problems including the possibility of losing 
power over the mandated mission. While this has a negative effect to collaboration, to weak agencies it is of 
value as Dawes (1988, p.40 cited in Bardach, 1998, p.167) considers that the protection purpose rescues such 
weak agencies, proves their professional responsibility, enables them to avoid criticism of overseers and 
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superiors who may supervise the collaboration, and also avoids the loss of existing assets (clients, money, 
autonomy) belonging to the weak agency. 
Second, agencies may fear to contribute resources due to the possibility that collaborative activities may 
cause inefficiencies to their agencies due to additional organisational activities whereby there will be competing 
means of serving both sides. Third, an agency may refuse to collaborate to avoid the hassles associated with 
implementations thereby causing delivery failure. Fourth, the agencies may refuse to contribute resources 
because of irrelevancy of the collaboration venture in relation to the core mission of the organisation, which is 
likely to interfere with the agency's method of doing things, the nature of resource utilisation, and law 
enforcement. Fifth, agencies may avoid collaborations if they fear they may lose their power over clients, actions 
and social value due to relocation of activities and centres of action following the collaboration. 
Willingness purpose: Using Value to create purpose as a key reason for avoiding resource 
contribution on one hand, may enhance willingness to contribute resources on the other hand. Bardach (1998) 
urges that individuals including legislators, managers, and line workers who are motivated to create public value, 
may ensure that the implementation of promising partnerships works. To ensure the public value, the legislators 
may appropriate basket funds which reinforce the partner agencies to join the collaborative ventures; the agency 
managers may provide guidance and support to the collaborative works; and the committed line workers may 
spend their time and energy in order to affect the collaboration activities. 
Further, Bardach claims that some organisational actors may have conceived a public need and 
become willing to meet such needs, and be eager to push for policy changes. However due to their minority 
statuses within their organisations, they may have failed to do so. But when collaboration ventures of potential 
partner agencies become available, such people tend to push for the collaboration as it is the only way to gain a 
legitimate power to engage in political coalition building outside their organisations. When such people are 
exposed in collaboration ventures, they are sometimes used as a door to access other potential actors within 
their organisations who could otherwise not be accessed without their assistance. 
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4.4.2 Careerist purpose 
Avoidance purpose: Civil servants tend to avoid collaborative works if they sense that the collaborative 
venture will jeopardise their carriers. According to Bardach ( 1998) public servants have their own personal 
ambitions such as: job security, high income, decision making power, good reputation, and opportunities for well 
paying jobs. Should the individuals predict any negative effect to their personal ambitions following interagency 
relationships, top managers may tend to block collaborations, and middle managers tend to distort or delay 
collaborative processes. At the start of the collaboration process, should such individuals (mostly public servants) 
sense the need to cut down workers, reduce salaries, increase or reduce workloads, and or amalgamate 
managerial posts to reduce operational costs, they tend to drop out immediately; should the agencies discover 
that the collaboration venture is primarily for prevention rather than control, the agencies who work to treat the 
problem may shy away, knowing it may shrink their workloads. Should the collaboration involve changing of the 
normal system of work, those individuals may avoid such collaborations due to fear of negative consequences on 
their carrier statuses such as mixing of lower and higher professionals, exposure of lower professionals to 
accountability demands of higher professions, and less likelihood of fitting the new system. Moreover, individuals 
may avoid collaboration due to fear of stress, the extent of the time involved, and complicated duties (both inter 
and intra organisational) of collaborative work. Bureaucrats may avoid collaborations due to fear of fruitlessness 
resulting from collaboration failures, embarrassment, criticism, and damage to one's carrier reputation. 
Willingness purpose: Personal ambition for carrier promotion in bureaucratic and policy setting may 
equally motivate the individuals to desire collaborative works instead of avoiding. Bardach (1998, p. 188) 
comments that individuals whose agency's missions are threatened may become enthusiastic about 
collaborative ventures, hoping that by mixing with new agency professionals, they will renew their threatened 
carrier through the sharing of new ideas and information, enrichment and widening of their job coverage, gaining 
of creativity, new perspectives and information, and new learning. Individuals may, as well, push for interagency 
relationships which are likely to increase job security, provide new employment opportunities, and offer 
promotion of carrier positions. 
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4.4.3 Bureaucratic purpose 
Avoidance purpose: According to Bardach (1998, p. 179), the key issue to avoid in 
collaborations under bureaucratic purpose is fear of competition for the key resources- money, problem domain, 
and autonomy. The agencies are not ready to use their budget for collaborations, to fight for the domain, or to 
lose control over the domain. For instance, when the cost of implementing collaborative activities is presented, 
agencies tend to shy away; when agencies sense that they will fight for the clientele should the collaboration take 
place, they tend to hide information; when they fear they will loose decision power or autonomy, they avoid 
collaboration. When one agency tend to overpower the rest, the collaboration ends, and when the responsible 
agency perceives that the partners agencies will not perform better - while knowing it will be held accountable - it 
may not collaborate. 
The arguments are supported and to some extent they are practical. Since the turf justifies budget and 
so the autonomy over the turf, no single agency will like to loose any of these resources, for the agency's mission 
will be at risk and budget justification will be impaired. 
Willingness purpose: Bardach, (1998), claims that, instead of protecting bureaucratic turf and budget, 
agency professionals may as well turn to support inter-agency collaborations for the sake of enhancing their 
agency's income, creating bureaucratic venture capital, and meet environmental demands, For example, 
agency's professionals tend to join collaborative works which are funded simply because they are assured of 
revenue which adds up to their total budget, whereas only those agencies which prove to be loyal, enthusiastic, 
and committed to the mission of the donor are granted the funds. 
Moreover, due to rapid changing world, environmental demands of the public and government may 
awaken agencies to support collaborative works instead of avoiding them. 
4.5 Summary 
Resources are important in strengthening and promoting interagency collaborative works whereby turf, 
money and autonomy are the principle resources for interagency collaborations. Agencies need to share 
resources and power equally to avoid patronage or dependency. 
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Agencies may avoid or support collaborative interventions depending on three purposes . namely 
careerist, bureaucratic, and value oriented purposes. These three purposes can, on one hand, attract an agency 
to join collaborative ventures and on the other hand, can expel the desire to do so. 
To determine resource contributions, agencies must consider the impact associated with the 
collaboration ventures mostly on their: organisational mission, personal carriers, autonomy, revenue, and 
clientele population. 
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5 NEW ZEALAND GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION SYSTEM SUPPORT TO INTERAGENCY 
COLABORA TIONS 
5.1 Introduction 
5.2 Management overview in interagency collaborations 
NT AECSC (2008) states that interagency collaborations are built on a number of useful structures and 
functions such as governance, management, monitoring and evaluation as well as communication processes. 
The governance structure is said to focus on visioning, policy and practise changes and strategic planning, as 
well as clarifying and addressing the roles, mutual accountabilities, responsibilities and authority of communities 
shaping the system. The management structure is said to promote interagency collaboration at an administrative 
level by implementing strategic plans; training; coordination of both cases and interagency protocols for 
information sharing; and developing monitoring and evaluation processes that provide partners with up-to-date 
relevant information related to their joint efforts. This enables an assessment of partner effectiveness as well as 
manage outcomes. The communication process creates an open convincing process, and identifies and 
addresses the collaborative challenging issues. 
Pathfinder (2003) recommends that since the primary objective of interagency collaboration is to 
maximize benefits to citizens, the collaboration must focus on improving outcomes, and the agencies must both 
value the collaboration and have deep seated interests in shared outcomes. Each agency must have its own 
defined outcomes; well defined intervention logic; be clear about its accountabilities, roles, resources and 
interests shared with other agencies; and well defined processes, including a guiding committee, joint processes 
for gathering performance feedback; integration with other initiatives within the agency and results which justify 
costs (cost effective integrated actions). 
Pathfinder (2003) emphasizes that managers need to get their own houses in order (by delivering well 
defined intervention logic and clear outcomes) and inform their ministers and significant stakeholders about the 
progress of collaboration. They must define and agree on the shared outcomes (as working to different 
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objectives may result into future conflicts); be open, consultative and have an active leadership style; be clear 
about their own roles and responsibilities under the collaboration and that of others; and take time to build mutual 
trust, knowledge and commitment across the agencies. 
5.3 Government factors which influence interagency collaborations 
A number of factors promoted the agency collaborations in New Zealand. McAdam (2007) advises that 
key factors influencing agency collaboration in New Zealand include the ability to effectively deliver Strategic 
Result Areas (SRAs)(1994), Key Government Goals (2001), the development goals of the State Services 
Commission (SCC), and Managing for Outcomes (2002). 
Strategic Result Area (SRAs): Ketti (2000) noted that following a broader exploration of government 
policies (i.e. how outputs accumulates to outcomes), collaboration emerged as the government required 
agencies to apply strategies to determine SRAs on which to focus over for three to five years. The SRAs shaped 
the specific output required of the CEOs, their accountability over the same, and determined how their different 
pieces could fit together in the government policy to ensure public value. 
Key Government Goals in 2001: The overall goal of the New Zealand government was to "grow the 
economy to deliver greater prosperity, security and opportunity for all New Zealanders". To meet that the 
government of the time itemized six key goals. One of the key goals was to maintain trust in government and 
provide strong social services. According to the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPMC,2002), the 
goal focused on working in partnerships with communities, providing strong social services for all, building safe 
communities and promoting community development, keeping faith with the electorate, working constructively in 
parliament and promoting a strong and effective public service. 
Development Goals of SSC: To meet its plans of ensuring its effective support to economic and social 
success of New Zealand, McAdams (2007) says that one of the State Services Commission, (SSC) goals 
focuses on the coordination of state agencies to ensure that the contribution of government agencies is greater 
than sum of its parts. SSC(2006, p.5 cited in McAdam, 2007) emphasized that: "To accomplish this, we need to 
walk together more effectively. At time this will require us to make decisions that put the interest of the State 
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Services above those of our individual agencies. This will necessitate a broadening of our strategic vision and of 
our concepts of leadership, and trust in each other's ability to lead and to deliver that vision. This collaborative 
approach may also present some challenge in the short term". 
Managing for Outcomes in 2002: Lewis (2007) notes that the SSG issued a statement of managing for 
outcomes in 2002 with the objective of encouraging departments to report on their contribution to government 
outcomes. The departments need to focus on longer-term outcomes rather than outputs and to ensure the 
outcomes, the departments need to be coordinated with other sectors. 
Others: Stace and Cumming (2006) urges that interagency collaboration in New Zealand reflects the 
amended Public Finance Act of 2004 which calls for stronger governance relationships between government and 
crown entities, managing for outcomes rather than outputs, and public service standards for public resources. 
Moreover, the call for pluralistic policy approaches led to the adoption of governance mechanisms which focus 
on inclusive, cross-sectoral, and joined-up ways of working through networks, joint ventures, coalitions, and 
partnership between private, public, community, and voluntary sector organisations. 
However, in spite of the government support to agency collaborations, there are factors which tend to 
limit collaborations including too many bureaucratic procedures during contracting for services. 
5.4 Summary 
For successful interagency relationships to exist at a country level, there is a need to have sound public 
polices, and good management styles. To a large extent, the New Zealand government administration system 
promotes and supports partnership between private, public, community, and voluntary sector organisations in the 
delivery of social and health services. The support is reflected in strategic result areas, key government goals, 
development goals of the State Services Commission, and managing for outcomes policies. 
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6 RESEARCH FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS 
6.1 Introduction 
This section discusses the results of the case study with a major focus on general ideas around how the 
agencies work together in order to control and prevent HIV/AIDS, general indications of HIV/AIDS in New 
Zealand, available government environments which support interagency relationships, and resource 
contributions for inter-organisational relationships. 
6.2 General ideas of how the agencies integrate to control and prevent HIV/AIDS 
The objectives of the agencies involved in HIV/AIDS management are to ensure that: the at-risk 
population is not infected by the disease; the already infected population does not suffer unnecessarily from 
torture, stigma, discriminations, and pains, and does not spread the disease; mother to child HIV transmissions 
cease; further pressure for services on the health sector is reduced; there is no significant additional HIV/AIDS 
medical costs to the government; and the general population understands what HIV/AIDS is and their HIV 
statuses for further protection. 
The interagency relationships to control and prevent HIV/AIDS in New Zealand occur in a variety of 
ways: at policy planning and implementation levels, locally and internationally, and between agencies (inter-
agency) and within agencies (intra-agency). The depth of the relationship is based on the extent of resource 
sharing (mostly financial and personnel), and the extent to which the core activity of the agencies matches with 
the HIV/AIDS agenda. Agencies whose resource base depends on others, and whose core activities match the 
HIV/AIDS venture, like the GPs and NZAF, collaborate, but resource independent agencies like the IS and MoE, 
co-operate. The degree of interdependency promotes greater formalisation in these structures whereas, for less 
interdependent stakeholders, a loosely organised exchange of information is sufficient (Walker & Liston, 1979 
cited in Gray 1985). 
At local level, the MoH collaborates with the HIV /AIDS focused NGOs, and with some publicly funded 
health centres such as DHBs and GPs (intra agency); and also cooperates with other public organisations 
including the Ministry of Education (MoE) and IS. The NGOs cooperate with both each other, and with the public 
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organisations, and the IS collaborates with the GPs who provide consultations for HIV/AIDS related issues within 
the IS. 
Internationally, the MoH co-operates with other international agencies such as the United Nations 
General Assembly on HIV/AIDS (UNGASS), WHO, Australia, and the Pacific; NZAF cooperates with some 
international NGOs from the Pacific region; and the IS coordinates with overseas panel doctors and laboratories 
to ensure that tests for health conditions such as TB, and HIV/AIDS are done using up-to-date methods and 
equipment. They also coordinate with the International Health Immigration Health Working Group which 
comprises representatives of immigration including Australia and Canada to discuss issues of migration and 
health. 
Bardach (1998) states that to create public value, agencies need to specialise and integrate. To a large 
extent, specialisation of the agencies contributes to the government expectations on HIV/AIDS outcomes for the 
public. In the case study, each agency does what fits most effectively in its area of specialisation. For example, 
the IS is specialised in border control for migration purposes, thus they have the capabilities to successfully 
implement the immigration policy on HIV/AIDS testing for all immigrants who want to live in New Zealand for 
more than six months, especially those from HIV high risk countries. NZAF, who originally specialised in 
managing HIV cases among men who have sex with men (MSM), provides professional HIV/AIDS services to the 
MSM, African migrants, people living with HIV/AIDS, and other at-risk populations. DHBs, and GPs who 
specialise in general medical services such as laboratory tests, treatments and counselling, supply the ARVs, 
provide HIV/AIDS laboratory testing and counselling services; Needle Exchange Programmes supply syringes 
and needles to the injecting drug users, implement HIV programmes for the IDUs. The MoH specialises in 
implementing education training programmes, and the education programme on sexual and reproductive health 
for all students aged 13-17 years. 
The respective agencies integrate through meetings, forums, telephone calls, e-mails, and conferences, 
and formally there are two HIV/AIDS related national meetings, run by the MoH. Other meetings depend on the 
state of emergency that may exist and other arrangements the agencies may make. 
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6.3 General indications of HIVIAIDS infections and its treatments in New Zealand 
Since its discovery in New Zealand in 1980s among the MSM community, HIV/AIDS has spread to other 
populations and the number of infected people is escalating. NZAF (2009a) shows that to date, the most highly 
affected group is still MSM, followed by African migrants. In 2008 MSM accounted for 83% of the total HIV 
diagnoses recorded in New Zealand, followed by the heterosexual community (17%), the majority of whom 
contracted the disease from overseas (mostly Africa). 
According to the 2009a report, surveillance data for HIV/AIDS in New Zealand for the first six months of 
2009 showed that 3,192 (0.075%) people of the total New Zealand population of 4,268, 600 were living with 
HIV/AIDS. Of these, Europeans accounted for 49.7%, Maori 7.20%, Pacific 3.3%, Asian 11.7%, Africans 21.3%, 
others 3.5%, and an unknown group 3.0%. Further, a total number of 1,012 people were notified with HIV/AIDS 
in the first quarter of 2009. Of this latter group, 700 (69.2%) were European, 112 (11.1 %) Maori, 34 (3.3%) 
Pacific people, 72 (7.1 %) African, 61 (6.0%) Asian, 26 (2.6%) of other ethnicity. Information on ethnicity was not 
provided for 7 (0.7%). Nevertheless, there are high incidences of STis among youth aged 20 and under and the 
most common STI is Chlamydia followed by Gonorrhoea, and Syphilis, UNGASS, (2007). 
WHO (2009) emphasises that every country should implement HIV/AIDS prevention and control 
interventions to reduce the chances of HIV/AIDS transmissions. The measures includes treatment of HIV/AIDS 
by using quality ARVs, regular use of condoms, male circumcisions, provision of clean injecting equipment, blood 
safety, monitoring of the most-at-risk-population, prevention of mother-to-child transmissions, treatment of STis, 
and HIV testing and counselling. Janssen J., et al. (2007), emphasises that by knowing their serostatuses, 
HIV/AIDS victims become more careful in their sexual behaviour. In New Zealand the control and prevention of 
HIV/AIDS is very practical. HIV/AIDS treatments using ARVs (of about 18 different types) and HIV/AIDS testing 
and counselling services for all citizens - including non-citizen pregnant women - are free. Further, HIV/AIDS 
prevention measures target the at-risk populations, already affected populations, and pregnant women. 
Prevention measures includes social marketing, free condom programmes, pre-natal HIV testing for every 
pregnant woman, and free testing and counselling services for all STis. 
According to an MoH official, the major causes of the HIV/AIDS increasing cases in New Zealand are: 
the HIV positive migrants who entered New Zealand before the 2005 immigration policy of HIV/AIDS testing for 
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all migrants who want to stay in New Zealand for more that six months; the increased number of people joining 
the homosexual community with more youths who are less knowledgeable and able to negotiate about sex 
engaging in at-risk behaviours such as group sex and online dating; the increased number of New Zealanders 
who travel overseas especially to high risk HIV countries and engage in risky sexual behaviours; and the stable 
number of the H IV patients who do not die following the introduction of the free ARVs. 
In general HIV/AIDS in New Zealand is not as serious as in other countries. For instance, infections are 
common among the drug injecting people in other countries such as Eastern Europe and Asia, but in New 
Zealand it is not the case. However given its small population of 4 million people whose 0.075% are affected, and 
the complicated means of disease transmissions, prevention, and control, something more credible needs be 
undertaken by the government to ensure the rate of infection remains stable. 
6.4 Extent of government administrative system support to interagency collaborations 
IPS (2008) points out that interagency collaboration in New Zealand is increasing as agencies find that 
the normal service delivery system is ineffective for complex problems. This applies to the case study as the 
agencies engage in collaborations as a matter of agency's concern over wicked issues, and not as a government 
policy requirement. It is the people in roles such as middle managers or top managers who in most cases initiate 
collaborations after discovering that their agencies cannot address the wicked issues through the normal service 
delivery system. Apart from that, CEOs are held accountable for the wicked issues facing their organisations. For 
example, the MoH had to ensure co-operation with the IS when it was learned that the number of HIV positive 
migrants was escalating2. The outcome was the 2005 new immigration health policy of mandatory HIV/AIDS 
testing for all people (especially those from HIV high risk countries) wanting to travel to and reside in New 
Zealand for more than 12 months. 
Bardach (1998) urges that the success of collaboration depends a lot upon the government administrative 
system. The government must supply environments which enable talented individuals to practice their knowledge 
2 Public health centres expressed their concern about the rapid increasing number of HIV/AIDS among migrants- mostly those from Africa (refugees and 
Zimbabweans) 
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of interagency collaborations and must be adept at influencing personnel and ensuring financial resources for 
collaboration. To a large extent, the New Zealand government administrative system supports interagency 
collaborations. Firstly, the feasible, coherent, and integrated public policies support integration both between and 
within government departments, and between government and non-government organisations. According to an 
MoH official, the government requires public policies to be developed out of high criteria and in harmony with 
other sectors' needs - mostly the sectors which are likely to benefit or bear the burden of the policy outcomes-
and managers need to exercise good practice. For example, the IS (which is responsible for entry of tourists, 
students, and skilled workers who come to contribute to the economy), consults with the tourist and education 
sectors, the Department of Labour, and the MoH during policy development to ensure their needs and concerns 
are taken into account. 
Secondly, the strong legal framework ensures strong rules and orders and high levels of transparency and 
accountability, and promotes effective implementation of public policies. For example, Ministers and CEOs are 
held accountable for the activities of their departments and the contributions their activities make to the outcomes 
the government wants for its citizens, and failure to do so may lead to termination of their contracts (SSC,2006). 
There is also prompt enactment of laws whenever conditions require change - lor instance the legalisation of 
prostitution, to improve human rights and health status of the prostitutes, (UNGASS,2007). 
Thirdly, there is outstanding government funding for public agencies. The legislature appropriates significant 
budgets for public agencies to pursue their missions. It is such funding which allows the agencies to engage in 
interagency relationships. Had the budget not been enough for the IS, they would have been unable to channel 
sufficient resource money to consulting medical practitioners, or maintain the network with panel doctors 
worldwide for the HIV/AIDS cooperation venture. Nor could the MoH fund the 16,500 health service delivery 
contracts- including those for HIV/AIDS (Stace &Cumming, 2006). 
Fourth, there is good management, such as strategic planning at top levels and adherence to protocols for 
information sharing which enables an exchange of new information, and the expression of issues of concern 
such as adverse reactions from decisions made by other agencies. De Carolis et al. (2007) urges that with well 
developed collaboration communications channels at all levels, the exchange of information, feedbacks and 
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perceptions among the partners, as well as the ability to work as a cohesive team, becomes easier. According to 
an MoH official, the MoH funds two annual conferences where participants from the HIV/AIDS agencies express 
their issues of concern, in particular any adverse reactions of the IS3; further the MoH provides funds for HIV 
surveillances data and their frequent publications. In addition, the contracted NGOs are required to produce 
major reports every six months. 
Moreover, the developed New Zealand infrastructure supports interagency collaborations. For example, the 
free telephone services within regions and high speed broadband services in most places enables interagency 
collaboration. Specific examples are: the contracted NGOs may use telephones and internet services to make 
frequent communication with the agencies involved in HIV /AIDS collaborations and the IS uses internet and 
telephonic conferences to discuss key health issues including HIV/AIDS with the international stakeholders such 
as the panel doctors. 
6.5 Resource contributions for interagency relationships in New Zealand 
The interagency relationships to control and prevent HIV/AIDS in New Zealand involve resources 
sharing and the extent of contributions is determined by the depth of the relationship. The collaborating agencies 
(NGOs, DHBs, and GPs) do share significant amount of resources, whereas the co-operating agencies share 
negligible resources. 
The major key resources are turf, autonomy, and financial. In the case study, the key turf are the people 
living with HIV/AIDS, at risk population of the youth, MSM, injecting drug users and African migrants. 
The major source of resources is divided into three categories: the agency's own budget from the 
government, charity donations to the agencies, and contract funds for health service delivery. Collaborating 
agencies such as the MoH, GPs, publicly funded health sectors, and the NGOs share funds from the government 
through the MoH. About 80% of the lead agency budget goes to the public health sectors and 20% to the 
contracted NGOs. The 80% and 20% MoH funds for both public and NGO organisations provides for a variety of 
health services including the HIV/AIDS programmes. Further the MoH contributes money for engagement with 
3 Immigration Services was blamed for the inconsistent policy of HIV and AIDS testing for all immigrants. The IS sometimes allowed entry of some HIV 
positive migrants on the basis that they had economically potential, or had professionally high expertise. This caused pressure for health services in the 
public sector. 
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partner agencies such as meetings, forums and conferences. The cooperating agencies such as the MoE, and 
the IS, use their own budget to implement the shared HIV/AIDS activities. For example, to implement education 
programmes for reproductive health and a sexual strategy for students in years 13-17, the MoE uses its own vote; 
and to ensure effective HIV screening for the migrants, IS uses its own budget. 
Gray(1989) urges that the recognition by stakeholders that their actions are linked to the actions of the other 
stakeholders is a critical basis for collaboration. Moreover, Bardach (1998) says that an agency's professionals 
tend to join collaborative works which are funded simply because they are assured of revenue which adds up to 
their total budget. On one hand, resource dependency has been the key factor for the collaboration between the 
MoH and the NGOs and the resource dependency has pushed for collaborations. For example, the NZAF official 
said "we try to do what we can to ensure our relation with the MoH remains stable, as they give us 93% of our 
budget". 
The resource interdependency is good, but precautions should be taken to avoid engagement of less 
qualifying agencies that may end up wasting the collaboration resources, hence the lead agency needs to 
carefully scrutinise the partner agencies before initiating the collaborative ventures. 
On the other hand, collaboration has been a matter of good practise of the agencies. The CEOs of the 
cooperating agencies are held accountable for the outcomes of their actions. For instance the IS was held 
accountable for the adverse reactions from its decisions, in particular the entry of HIV positive migrants. The 
MoH official said, "the IS had no way out as they are required to ensure harmony with other sectors, that is why 
the IS had to implement the HIV/AIDS testing policy in 2005". 
Walker (2006) suggests that resource sharing in collaborative work tends to strengthen the relationship and 
move it from simple to complex, informal to formal, or from co-existence to collaboration. In regard to the case 
study, according to the IS official, there are less chances of advancing the relationship in the future due to the 
mismatch between the core activities of the IS and the HIV/AIDS venture. Given the two theoretical and practical 
arguments, this implies that strengthening of relations is likely to happen between the lead agency and those 
agencies whose core missions more closely match the collaboration venture. Thus the developmental stages of 
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the relationships (simple-complex, cooperation to collaboration) indicate the time needed for the agencies to 
understand each other's potentiality and the collaboration venture. 
IPS (2008) emphasises that for successful collaborations, each member agency needs to be treated as 
being of equal potential in terms of resources, information or influence to define and address the issues of 
concern. Autonomy among the partner agencies in the case study is somehow shared fairly. Although the MoH is 
perceived to be more powerful, this is not always the case. Sometimes the MoH is flexible and tends to leave 
decisions to the agencies. This is also supported by IPS (2008) who states that if one agency has more 
resources than the others, to avoid diminishing contributions that others can make, the powerful agency should 
be wiling to share power and resources among the group in a way that will not create dependency or patronage. 
Bardach (1998) urges that agencies must build cultures of mutual trust and pragmatism to ensure successful 
collaborations .. According to a NZAF official, apart from prolonged bureaucracy during the contracting process, 
the contracting process is fair, reasonable, and the relationship is stable. For example the MoH official said "the 
NZAF can decide to over-spend before consulting us and may claim the difference later. In 2005 they decided to 
add the African migrants as new clientele with a related increase in cost, and we were happy with that. Moreover 
the NZAF writes proposals stating all activities to be implemented and in most cases we don't question much on 
the same, we approve the proposals on the basis of mutual trust". 
Equal power and trust is important and highly supported. However, regardless of importance of the equal 
power sharing, there is a need for the principle agency to dominate the partner agencies on occasions for the 
sake of accountability. The principle agency is held accountable for the outcomes of the services being 
contracted for, thus power domination is sometimes inevitable to ensure adherence to the rules of the game. This 
is why Bardach ( 1998) claims that, if the responsible agency perceives that the partner agency will not perform 
better, while knowing it will be held accountable, it may not collaborate. 
Gray (1985) urges that the degree of power among the stakeholders is closely linked to the degree of 
interdependency, as powerful stakeholders who perceive no interdependence try to preserve their control over 
the domain and endeavour to resist attempts to share power with other partners' agencies. In the case study, on 
one hand, the resource independent agencies have strong autonomy over the funded agencies, and autonomy 
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between public agencies that are at the same level of decision making tends to be attenuated. The MoH holds 
more power over the NGOs, however its autonomy over the IS and the MoE tends to be reduced, and the IS has 
the ability to make decisions just like the MoH. For example, IS has been in crisis with the MoHand other partner 
agencies over HIV positive migrants4. However, resource dependency agencies like the NZAF do not have such 
power to resist or force an issue. The NZAF official said sometimes it takes a long struggle to sell their ideas on 
HIV/AIDS. "We think we have rich information and expertise on HIV/AIDS issues, however whenever we want to 
advocate for some key evidence based policies, other organisations do not buy our ideas up-front". 
On the other hand, most rich resource dependency agencies have strong power over the less rich 
resource dependency agencies .. Friend et al., (1974) notes that some stakeholders have greater control over 
the decision process than others, a fact which cannot be ignored. Pfeffer &Salancik (978); and Aldrich(1976 cited 
in Gray, 1985) urge that without direct access to critical resources, some organisations become dependent on 
and vulnerable to the actions of the others in the network. The discretionary power of NZAF over the other NGOs 
is stronger due to NZAF's resource richness (expertise and experience, finance, administration, turf) over the 
other NGOs. For example, NZAF chairs forums, advocates for policy changes, and chairs the UNGASS report 
writing which is not done by the other NGOs, NZAF, (2009a). 
Gray ( 1985) states that evidence suggests that effective collaboration cannot take place unless the key 
stakeholders posses roughly equal capability to influence domain development. In the case study, key powerful 
agencies are the MoH, IS and the NZAF and as these agencies have significant resources to influence the 
domain including finance, they are the reason behind the successful HIV /AIDS control and prevention measures. 
In general these varieties of discretionary powers among the agencies over the domain (HIV/AIDS) 
imply that, first, autonomy of an agency is closely correlated to its resource capacity, second, the hierarchy of an 
4 The IS is blamed for inconsistency and unreliability in implementing the health policy. Although HIV/AIDS testing for immigrants is a must, still a certain 
number of migrants get permission to enter New Zealand with HIV status, or at few times some migrants who were allowed entry on the basis of good 
health, are found HIV positive upon arrival in New Zealand. 
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agency determines its autonomy, and third, agencies whose core mission matches the collaborative venture, 
tend to be powerful due to ease in the justification of their budget. 
Bardach (1998) urges that the more agencies find themselves competing for the same resource niche 
(funds or problem domain), the more they distract each others' motivations, and hide information about their own 
resource caches. Given the large number of the NGOs involved in HIV /AIDS compared to the limited number of 
the HIV clientele, the available turf is "up for grabs" simply because some of the NGOs are rooted in narrow fields. 
The IS, which is focussed on ensuring border security, is never likely to compete with NZAF for clientele as their 
fields are too different. However the key clientele for the NZAF, the Needle Exchange programme, Body Positive 
Inc., and the New Zealand Prostitute Collective, are likely to be the same. For instance, a HIV positive prostitute 
becomes a "grab client" for the NZAF who provide care and support services to PLWHA, and also for the New 
Zealand Prostitute Collective who cares for the prostitutes; or a gay drug injecting man becomes a "grab client" 
for the Needle Exchange Programme who distributed needles and syringe, and for the NZAF who distributes 
condoms and lubricants. To some extent, the fight for turf has created a tension between the NGOs. 
Bardach ( 1998) urges that resource money can be the key reason for terminating, delaying, or avoiding 
collaborative relationships, simply because the agencies tend to be selfish, either by withholding the potential 
funds or by hiding the information about existence of funding opportunities. When interviewed on their relations 
regarding the turf, and their plans towards additional funding for the HIV/AIDS projects in the future, NZAF official 
said, "other NGOs have started later than us and are now struggling to take our clientele, which is why we never 
talk to them about our financial arrangements with the MoH". The theory and practical arguments are possible, 
the tension is inevitable and the only way the NGOs can avoid it is by broadening their missions to accommodate 
new turfs. 
Personnel resource is also shared but not as much as money or turf. Bardach (1998) believes that 
agencies in inter-organisational relationships tend to rely on their staff for human resources and that staff tend to 
remain in their usual workplace. However, where the collaborative venture is new to the agencies, particular staff 
may be shifted from their work places or hired from outside to enable the collaboration. This applies to the case 
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study. During the interview, the MoH official said, "IS did not have professional doctors to handle the HIV/AIDS 
case when the cooperation venture came upon, so what they did was to hire professionals from the MoH. 
De Carolis et al., (2007, cited in NTAECSC, 2008) claims that with well developed collaboration 
communications channels at all levels, the exchange of information, evaluation, and feedback perception among 
partners (as well as working as a cohesive team) becomes easier. To manage the interagency relationships, the 
major means of evaluating the activities of the NGOs is through the use of big reports which are submitted every 
six months by each contracted NGO. The NGOs are held accountable for the outcome of their activities. 
According to the MoH official, to date none of the NGOs has been denied renewal of contract due to failure. 
The use of reports for evaluation is supported. However, given human errors, in order to ensure effective 
collaborations, the lead agency needs to have a separate monitoring and evaluation unit whose staff can conduct 
professional evaluations. The evaluation will confirm the reports, as well as aid in gaining a general 
understanding of what works well on the ground and what does not, to enable managing for outcomes, such as 
policy changes and or advanced strategic planning. 
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7 Conclusion and Recommendations 
7.1 Conclusion 
Generally, interagency relationships to control and prevent HIV/AIDS in New Zealand occur with 
paramount resource sharing and with negligible resource sharing (collaborations and cooperation) and at 
different levels i.e. at international and national levels, within agencies and between agencies(intra and inter). 
The relationships are well supported by the government policies and to a greater extent, the resource 
interdependencies of the agencies motivate the interagency relationships. 
HIV/AIDS in New Zealand is obvious with 0.075% of the population affected. The number is increasing with 
time, and the most at-risk population is the gay community, followed by the heterosexual community (mostly the 
Africans migrants). However the proportion is negligible compared to other countries where HIV/AIDS is 
widespread up to 26% of the population. The government is well positioned to fight the disease, however given 
the nature of disease transmissions and the difficulties in its control and prevention measures, the government of 
New Zealand needs to excel more with the current HV/AIDS measures. 
Personal obseNations as per the study The rate of H IV I AI OS infections in New Zealand is very low 
compared to other countries. Given the time the disease was first recognised (early 1980s), and the current total 
number of affected people, the rate is quite low. However, it is very strange that only the gay community is highly 
susceptible to the disease, as the affected persons in the heterosexual community are mostly migrants who 
contracted the disease from overseas. It is worthwhile for medical researchers to investigate the gay men 
HIV/AIDS scenario as it may help in the development of new and better prevention measures. 
What is referred to as "interagency collaborations" in both literature and practise by some scholars, can 
actually mean collaboration, co-ordination, and/or co-operation. This can at times be really confusing and 
misleading. Few scholars have managed to explain the terminology correctly; they have used "interagency 
relationships" to explain collaborations, cooperation and coordination, and they have used the term 
collaborations to explain relationships which involve intensive resource sharing. Thus more socialisation of the 
term is necessary to ensure consistence and meaning of the term·" interagency collaborations." 
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Effective inter-organisational relationships especially interagency collaborations will only occur if the 
organisations have firstly, mutual interdependencies, secondly, a good governance system which recognises and 
supports inter-organisational relationships, and thirdly, each agency's lead persons/initiators must have 
exceptional ability and values (good leadership, negotiation, influencing and management skills, motivated 
towards outcomes, and enthusiastic about the needs of the community) which can enable them to effectively 
steer the joint work. 
There is no way that power imbalances in inter-organisational working relationships may be avoided. 
The most resourceful agency/agencies in interagency relationships have the management skills to influence the 
venture, have outstanding budgets, are experienced in the perceived problem and perhaps have 
data/information about the problem. Thus, even if the partners perceive that there is power balance, in a real 
sense there is not, rather, it is a matter of technical handling of the whole process. For instance, if an agency 
does not have enough budget, it will never be able to negotiate effectively over issues and will therefore be 
unable to influence, or if an agency do not have enough information and expertise over the shared problem, will 
never be able to influence the joint discussions. 
A culture of trusting each other among the agencies as well as being practical is the backbone of 
successful interagency relationships, and mostly interagency collaborations. If the agencies do not have culture 
of trust, even if all other resources are made available, the ability of the joint venture to move forward easily is 
much less likely. 
Inter-organisational relationships can be compared to an agency which acts as a rival agency to the 
participating agencies. This being the case, agencies do think strategically before initiating relationships in order 
to ensure their autonomy over the domain, agency budget, and personal carriers remains intact. Thus successful 
inter-organisational relationships especially collaborations are the ones whose partner agencies do not sense 
any danger, rather they perceive benefits. 
The three theories used in the study (interagency collaboration capacity, resource dependency, and 
networking capacity) underpin each other, rather than being separate. They make sense when put together. 
Agencies will not succeed in joint ventures if they don't have resource interdependencies; they will not 
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communicate matters effectively if they don't have a well established central networking system; and will never 
reach the desired goals if they don't have the ability to control the whole process of interagency relationship in a 
manner which ensures the outcomes while at the same time maintaining harmony among the agencies. 
Lastly, where there are more than three agencies working together for the resolution of a common 
problem to ensure effectiveness, mutual respect, and understanding among the agencies, there must be a 
separate autonomous unit (committee, council, central body) selected from the members to oversee, coordinate 
and fine tune actions of the members. Without such a body, it is likely that the agencies will lack effective 
common understanding which may cause misuse of resources over processes such as extended negotiations. 
The key task of the unit can be controlling and moderating actions of the partner agencies which are quite tricky 
when conducted without such a central body. 
7.2 Recommendations 
Interagency relationships to control and prevent HIV/AIDS in New Zealand are fragmented. The current 
national coordinator NZAF is ineffective due to insufficient power - caused by inadequate resources and 
autonomy. Thus there is a need to develop a National Policy on HIV/AIDS and a national coordinating body or 
council created and enacted by Parliament. Such a council will have the power to timely develop new HIV/AIDS 
related policies, and or advise the government effectively on the same. Moreover, the council will act as an 
overseer of the multi-sectoral responses to HIV/AIDS and provide guidance to the partner sectors, and will 
provide leadership roles. 
The escalating rate of STis including Chlamydia indicates that there is need for an urgent amendment of the 
Sexual and Reproductive Health Strategy by the MoH in order to reduce the escalating number of STis. As well, 
the Public Health Bill needs to be enacted to ensure close monitoring of STis to ensure effective strategy 
development. 
Immigration New Zealand needs to cooperate effectively with the HIV/AIDS agencies.The IS needs to 
carefully scrutinise its health policies and act feasibly and consistently. Where possible, the government needs to 
intervene and ensure that the proposed measures by the partner agencies are taken into effect by the IS. 
There is need for some agencies to broaden their mission so as to avoid competition for turf and autonomy. 
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The number of overseas travellers bringing back HIV infections into the country needs to be reduced by 
implementing a programme for all New Zealand travellers. The programme should require all travelling New 
Zealanders to access HIV/AIDS promotion and awareness materials prior to departure so that their health, safety 
and wellbeing when in foreign countries, particularly those travelling to HIV high prevalence countries, is not 
compromised. 
There is a need to increase mass awareness of HIV/AIDS. The current public awareness campaigns through 
the media are too few, brief and limited. Part of the population is still in a dilemma as to what HIV/AIDS actually is. 
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LIST OF COUNTRIES WITH PANEL OF DOCTORS FOR CARRYING OUT MEDICAL EXAMINATON FOR IMMIGRATION 
NEW ZEALAND. 
Country: Armenia 
City or County: Yerevan 
Doctor/Clinic: Dr Armen Pirouzyan 
Address: Malatia Medical Centre, 28A Varougan 
Street, Yerevan 375032 
Phone: + 37 4 1 773 079 or + 37 4 1 520 028 Fax: + 
374 1 583 333 Email: pirouzyaar@state.gov 
Type: Doctor 
Country: Australia 
Phone: 0061 2 9806 7333 
Notes: For Applicants who are in Australia who require 
health checks for Immigration New Zealand 
requirements, please refer to Health Services Australia 
for assistance. Note: Your medical will need to have a 
Health Services Australia stamp on it. 
Country: Austria 
City or County: Bregenz 
Doctor/Clinic: Dr Anton Glocklhofer 
Address: Deuringstrasse 3/3, 6900 Bregenz 
Phone: + 43 557 452 233 Fax: +43 557 522 3318 
Type: Doctor 
Country: Austria 
City or County: Bregenz 
Doctor/Clinic: Dr Ingrid Mayrhauser 
Address: Bahnhofstrasse 39, 6900 Bregenz 
Phone: + 43 557 443 624 
Type: Radiologist 
Country: Austria 
City or County: Graz 
Doctor/Clinic: Dr Gert Tillich 
Address: Hans Sachs-Gasse 5, 1 Stock, 8010 Graz 
Phone:+ 43 316 825 232 
Type: Doctor 
Country: Austria 
City or County: Graz 
Doctor/Clinic: Dr Helmfried Winter 
Address: Privatklinik Ragnitz, Berthold-Linderweg 15, 
8047 Graz 
Phone: + 43 316 596 2200 Fax: + 43 316 596 2205 
Type: Radiologist 
Country: Austria 
City or County: lnnsbruck 
62 
L 
[~ Doctor/Clinic: Dr Friedrich Bischinger 
Address: Gabelsbergerstr. 41, 6020 lnnsbruck 
[ Phone:+ 43 512 399 885 Fax:+ 43 512 399 8859 Email: f.bischinger@tirol.com 
Type: Radiologist 
[: Country: Austria 
City or County: lnnsbruck 
[: Doctor/Clinic: Dr Andreas Pfretschner Address: Museumstrasse 24/1, 6020 lnnsbruck 
Phone:+ 43 512 580 019 
[ Type: Doctor 
[ Country: Austria City or County: Klagenfurt 
Doctor/Clinic: Dr Imelda Rainer 
[ Address: Burggasse 23/1, 9020 Klagenfurt Phone:+ 43 463 512 256 Fax:+ 43 463 512 256 Type: Doctor 
[ Country: Austria 
City or County: Klagenfurt 
c Doctor/Clinic: Dr Wilfried Wertritschnig Address: Facharzt fur Radiologie, Fleischmarkt 9/1, 9020 Klagenfurt 
[ Phone:+ 43 463 513 040 Type: Radiologist 
[ Country: Austria City or County: Linz Doctor/Clinic: Dr B Povysil 
Address: Childrens & Womens Hospital, 
c Krankenhausstr. 26, 4020 Linz Phone: + 43 732 6923 267 40 Fax: + 43 732 78 16 50 
Type: Radiologist 
c Country: Austria 
City or County: Salzburg 
[ Doctor/Clinic: Dr Regine, Dr Stipicic Address: Guggenmoosstrasse 41, 5020 Salzburg 
Phone:+ 43 662 433 391 
[ Type: Doctor 
Country: Austria 
[ City or County: Salzburg Doctor/Clinic: Dr Heribert Schurich 
Address: lmbergstrasse 6, 5020 Salzburg 
[ Phone: + 43 662 870 244 Fax: + 43 662 876 956 Type: Radiologist 
[ Country: Austria City or County: Traun 
[~ 63 
[~ 
[ Doctor/Clinic: Dr Ulrike Haas 
Address: Arztin fur Allgemeinmedizin, Linzerstrasse 
[ 12/2, A-4050 Traun Phone: + 43 676 384 8739 Fax: + 43 722 980 07 4 
Email: ulrike.haas@utanet.at 
[~ Type: Doctor 
Country: Austria 
[ City or County: Vienna Doctor/Clinic: Dr Andreas Braunsteiner 
Address: Wiedner Hauptstrasse 15, 1040 Vienna 
[ Phone:+ 43 1 505 26190 Type: Radiologist 
[ Country: Botswana City or County: Gaborone 
Doctor/Clinic: Dr A E Lambat 
c Address: Plot 8905, Broadhurst, Extension 19, Gaborone 
Phone: + 267 395 3233 Fax: + 267 390 0243 
[ Type: Doctor 
Country: Brazil 
c City or County: Bela Horizonte Doctor/Clinic: Dr Joao Mendes Alvares 
Address: Centro Medico Baeta Vianna, Rua dos 
[ Otani, 927 Conj 302, Bela Horizonte- CEP 30.150-321 
Phone:+ 55 31 3213 7172 Email: 
[ joaomendes@uaivip .com. br Type: Doctor 
[~ Country: Brazil City or County: Bela Horizonte Doctor/Clinic: Clinica Radiologica Javert Barros 
c 
Address: Rua Rio Grande do Norte, 63- 2° Andar; 
CEP 30.130-130 
Phone:+ 55 31 3224 2077 Email: 
crjb@veloxmail.com.br [ Type: Radiologists 
Country: Brazil [ City or County: Bela Horizonte Doctor/Clinic: Dr Joaquim Romeu Cancado, Maria 
da Gloria Barbosa Cancado & Dr Juliana Cancado 
[ Address: Rua dos Otani, 927 Conj 602, Bela Horizonte, MG 30.150-270 
Phone: + 55 31 3224 2335 Fax: +55 31 3273 4234 
[ Email: mariadagloriabcancado@gmail.com Type: Doctor 
[ Country: Brazil 
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City or County: Brasilia 
Doctor/Clinic: Dr Francisco Airton Borges de Oliveira 
Address: Edificio.Centro Clinico Sui, SHLS 716, 
Torre II- sala T-219, Cep: 70390-700 
Phone:+ 55 61 245 3133 Email: 
airtonborges@terra.com.br 
Type: Doctor 
Country: Brazil 
City or County: Fortaleza 
Doctor/Clinic: Dr Dirk Schreen 
Address: Rua Carlos Vasconcelos 977, Aldeota, 
Fotaleza - Ceara 60.315-170 
Phone:+ 55 85 3261 2926 or+ 55 85 3261 3264 
Email: dirksch@uol.com.br 
Type: Doctor 
Country: Brazil 
City or County: Fortaleza 
Doctor/Clinic: Radiology Clinic 
Address: Hospital Monte Klinikum, Rua Republica do 
Libano, 747,60.160-140 
List of some Overseas New Zealand panel doctors 
Phone:+ 55 85 266 2825 Email: 
radioclaudioteixeira@hotmail.com 
Type: Radiologist 
Country: Brazil 
City or County: Sao Paulo 
Doctor/Clinic: Dr lb Waldemar Andersen 
Address: Rua Antonio de Macedo Soares, 1902, 
Campo Belo, CEP 04607-003 
Phone:+ 55 11 5543 5086 or+ 55 11 5092 6458 
Email: ibandersen@uol.com.br 
Type: Doctor 
Country: Brazil 
City or County: Sao Paulo 
Doctor/Clinic: Radiology Clinic 
Address: Laboratorio Delboni Auriemo e Lavoisier, 
Avenida Angelica, 2229, Sao Paulo 01227-200 
Phone:+ 55 11 3047 4488 Fax:+ 55 11 3017 8276 
Hours: Mon- Fri: 6.30am- 6.30pm, Sat: 6.30am-
1.00pm 
Type: Radiologist 
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Country: Brazil 
City or County: Sao Paulo 
Doctor/Clinic: Dr Leite 
Address: Rua Sergipe, 441 - conj. 111A- 11.andar, 
Higienopolis 
Phone: (11)3661-9522 or 36630404 or 9905 0404 
Email: joaojl.clin@uol.com.br 
Type: Doctor 
Country: Brazil 
City or County: Sao Paulo 
Doctor/Clinic: Dr Paulo Ricardo Furbetta 
Address: Av. Brigadeiro Faria Lima, 1571 Conj. 2C, 
Pinheiros 01.452- 001 
Phone: +55 11 3031 1671 or+ 55 11 3032 8886 
Fax:+ 55 11 30311671 or+ 55 11 3032 8886 Email: 
furbeta@uol.com. br 
Type: Doctor 
Country: Brazil 
City or County: Sao Paulo 
Doctor/Clinic: Dr Dankwart Schreen 
Address: Centro Medico Manoel T. Hidai-
Consultorio 1206 B- 12 andar Av. Albert Einstein 
627/701, Bairro do Morumbi- SP, 05.691-900 
Phone:+ 55 11 3747 3206 or+ 55 11 3747 3266 
Fax:+ 55 11 3747 3526 Email: dankwart@uol.com.br 
Type: Doctor 
Country: Brazil 
City or County: Porto Alegre 
Doctor/Clinic: Dr Antonio Pozzer 
Address: Rua Santo Antonio, 277/203 
lndependencia, Porto Alegre- RS 91220-320 
Phone:+ 55 51 3311 7039 or+ 55 51 3311 7757 
Fax:+ 55 51 3268 8780 Email: 
aepozzer@terra.com.br 
Type: Doctor 
Country: Brazil 
City or County: Porto Alegre 
Doctor/Clinic: The Radiologist 
Address: Clinica Radiologica- CROL, Rua Antenor 
Lemos, 33, Menino Deus 90.850-100 
Phone:+ 55 51 3026 1500 
Type: Radiologist 
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[ Countries, areas, and territories with a low 
incidence of tuberculosis (TB) 
[ Andorra 
Antigua and Barbuda 
[ Australia Austria 
Barbados 
[ Belgium Bermuda 
British Virgin Islands 
Canada [ Cayman Islands Chile 
Costa Rica 
[ Cuba Cyprus 
Czech Republic 
[~ Denmark Dominica 
Finland 
c France Germany Greece 
0 
Grenada 
Iceland 
Ireland 
[ Israel (including the Occupied Palestinian Territory, and including East Jerusalem) 
Italy 
[ Jamaica Jordan 
Lebanon 
[, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Liechtenstein 
Luxembourg 
c Malta Monaco Montserrat 
[ Netherlands Antilles Netherlands 
New Zealand 
Norway [ Oman Puerto Rico 
Saint Kitts and Nevis 
[~ Saint Lucia San Marino 
Slovenia 
[ Sweden Switzerland 
Trinidad and Tobago 
[~ Turks and Caicaos Islands 
r 
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[ 
United Arab Emirates 
United Kingdom 
United States of America 
United States Virgin Islands 
Vatican City 
1
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